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ABSTRACT
Payment for Environmental Services (PES) Programs in Latin America and Mexico
have dominated the market-based environmental policy realm in the past decade due to
their new paradigm for solving the problem for ecosystem degradation. There are at least
three reasons why a careful examination of the design and implementation of these types of
programs is important for the environmental policy discussion in developing world
contexts. First and foremost, PES schemes offer several advantages: they are cost-effective,
they are institutionally simpler, and they are potentially good for poverty reduction.
Second, PES schemes embrace the user-based principle instead of the polluter-pays
principle and, in some cases, they have elements of a conditional cash transfer program.
Third, from a geographical perspective, PES programs are flexible and adaptive to local,
regional, national and international scales.
Despite the advantages from a design perspective, PES programs present a set of
issues and barriers at the implementation stage, especially within developing world contexts
where a set of preconditions must be in place in order for PES programs to work well. It is
particularly important in this regard to evaluate the effectiveness of PES programs in the
past decade in Mexico and Latin America. The main preconditions identified for an
examination of the Mexican case were well-defined property rights and a bias against the
poorest amongst the poor from PES program beneficiaries, which are mainly Ejidos. Based
on my findings in the PES literature and from the Mexican Pago por Servicios
Hidrológicos (PSAH) program evaluations, I propose an alternative framework to account
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for government, market, and communitarian failures that might arise at any traditional PES
scheme within a context of imperfect institutions.
In this investigation, I have posed the following questions: First, have PES schemes
as public policy interventions changed the behavior of landowners where the environmental
services are provided? Second, have the PES programs been effective in Mexico during the
last decade? And third, from a policy perspective, what can we learn from the governmentbased-to-user-based PES scheme transition that is currently taking place in Mexico?
I find that government-financed PES schemes have caused only modest or no
reversal of deforestation, and that case studies of user-financed, smaller-scale PES schemes
claim more substantial impacts to achieve environmental goals. So far, inconclusive
evidence exists regarding side goals of PES in Latin America –mainly, poverty alleviation,
land tenure, and local economic development.
Content analysis of cross-scale surveys nationwide indicates low environmental
service awareness of Ejidos environmental service providers. I also find that the notion of
additionality is partially supported, in the sense that most Ejidos claim that PES programs
have made a difference towards environmental sustainability. However, the theoretical
concept of additionality in the literature only suggests dichotomist results under an either/or
approach.
Impact, process, and results-based evaluations of PSAH show positive impacts
(30%) in deforestation reduction. However, after controlling for leakages and slippage,
estimates show a very low 12 percent net impact of PSAH. By evaluating the criteria rules
to allocate program benefits among enrolled and potential participants, I conclude that
iii

suboptimal targeting has decreased the effectiveness of the Mexican government-based
PES program throughout the study years. I argue that relatively low effectiveness levels of
the government-based PES program in Mexico have since 2011 led to the construction of
an alternative scheme under the same program, Fondos Concurrentes, which is deemed a
transitional program towards user-based and market creation projects at the local level. So
far, scant data of this section of the program is available.
Statistical Analysis of 35 locally-based schemes under the Fondos Concurrentes
program shows, on average, higher payments and lower land extensions from enrolled
participants as well as a multi-stakeholder participation at the local level and bundling of at
least two environmental services in one project. So far, not enough evidence exists to report
significant differences between additionality from government-based schemes and
additionality from a user-based type of PES scheme.
Nonetheless, policy-oriented findings and recommendations were identified in a
local case study in western Mexico at La Primavera forest, Ejido San Agustin. Six major
factors have been identified: first, the need for a holistic and polycentric system that
considers potential leakages and spillovers generated by public intervention through the
PES-Fondos Concurrentes program; second, the communitarian appropriation of local best
management practices, in addition to a focus on craftsmanship during the early years of the
program; third, an evaluation of preexisting social capital conditions; fourth, monitoring
and verification systems that combine local knowledge and GIS technology; fifth, preidentification of potential environmental service users and market creation strategies; and,
sixth, development of comprehensive technical support through academic institutions and
NGO´s, instead of a reliance on a single technician or middle man. Also, Best Management
iv

Practices must be used during the first year to establish a baseline for the development of a
monitoring and evaluation socio-ecological framework. In the near future, successful PES
projects will serve as a good source of data for future programs under the climate change
international agenda.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Environmental policy preferences in Mexico have recently shown a transition from
traditional command and control policies to market-based environmental policy instruments. In
a parallel way, this transition has trended from an exclusive government-based policy
orientation towards integration of multiple stakeholders, including direct environmental service
users. Under this context, a particular set of programs known as Payment for Environmental
Services (PES) has emerged as a market-based alternative instrument to compensate local
communities and private owners for the provision of environmental services. Such services
may include biodiversity, hydrological, carbon sequestration, recreational or aesthetic
investments on their own lands. Technically, the ultimate goal of PES programs is to
compensate for the positive externality that is created by the provision of environmental
services.
The key question arising from PES programs in the last 10 years is: Have PES

schemes as public policy interventions changed the behavior of landowners where the
environmental services are provided? If the answer is yes, then the PES program or scheme
is in a good position to achieve additionality and effectiveness, in other words, to add value
and achieve its intended effects. If not, it would only be a wealth transfer from the
environmental service user to the environmental service provider in the form of a
traditional subsidy. Proponents of PES schemes claim that behavioral change is nurtured
through the intervention. Market creation might come as a consequence. Skeptics argue that
potential and actual barriers (what they call “leakages”) mitigate the effectiveness of the
program. Within this debate, it is also claimed that both the effectiveness and efficiency of
PES schemes crucially depend on its design. Therefore, in the Chapter 2 literature review, I
1

compare the positions of published academic authorities on the question of the evolution of
Payment for Environmental Services in developing world contexts, mainly focusing on Latin
America and Mexico.

The popularity of PES programs in Latin America derives from its theoretical ex
ante advantages: First, PES offers a new paradigm for solving the problem of ecosystem
degradation. The main advantages of PES are: PES is cost-effective, it is institutionally
simpler, and PES can potentially achieve poverty reduction as a side goal. Moreover, PES
embraces the transition from a user-based towards a polluter-pays principle. In some cases
it has elements of a conditional cash transfer program. And finally, a PES program could be
adapted to local, regional, national, and international scale.
Among scholars, the Mexican Payment for Environmental Services Program is an
important case study in the policy debate for at least two reasons. First, the Mexican PES
Program provides ongoing data with respect to implementation of sophisticated market-based
environmental service programs in developing world and incomplete institution markets.
Second, it offers a case study that vividly illustrates the contrast between the Pigouvian and the
Coasian paradigms as well as the pros and cons that each approach has to offer currently. At the
implementation level, a thorough and careful examination of the Mexican PES experience and
program evolution provides valuable guidance for policy-makers in Mexico and Latin America
as they face the issues that emerge in transitions from government-based to user-based
programs.
Owing to the scale and the scope of the Mexican PES program, it offers a sound case

study from which conclusions can be drawn. Overall, the Mexican Payment for
Environmental Service is the highest scale program within countries with high
2

deforestation rates. From 2003 to 2013, ca. 5,800 forest communities have participated in
PES programs in Mexico, with 3.2 million hectares enrolled and 600 million dollars
allocated for PES programs in Mexico within the same period. Most program beneficiaries
are Ejidos, the Mexican PES common pool resource property rights regimes. This
institutional arrangement entitles Ejidos to become environmental service providers, with
profound implications in terms of environmental governance and decisions regarding the
provision, appropriation and exclusion of environmental services. Therefore, in Chapter 3 I
analyze the Ejido institutional and governance dynamics.
One of the issues that most scholars agree upon in the environmental policy
literature is that a typical PES should have the following characteristics: a voluntary
transaction; a well-defined environmental service ‘bought’ by a minimum of one ES buyer
from a minimum of one ES provider; and if and only if the ES provider secures ES
provision or conditionality. In Chapter 4, I propose that this framework is a necessary but
insufficient condition to achieve PES program effectiveness. To sustain this argument, I
elaborate on each of these five program conditions that a PES scheme should have, and I
account for at least one market, government or communitarian failure directly associated
with each of the five mentioned characteristics focusing on the Mexican case.
At the policy implementation level, a consequence of the failures that are examined
in Chapter 4 is that they might lead to poor selection and targeting of PES program
participants and eventually lower its effectiveness and additionality levels. The purpose of
Chapter 5 is then to explore the characteristics of the targeting criteria that were set during
the last decade for Mexico´s Payment for Hydrological Services (PSAH) programs.
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Furthermore, this chapter examines the policy implications of the targeting criteria that
have been used in the last 7 years to allocate PSAH projects
In this regard, one of the most striking failures regarding the management of public
PES schemes is lack of sound targeting mechanisms. Target rules determine justice,
distribution and access criteria for potential program participants. Ultimately, targeting
criteria decide the magnitude and direction of potential environmental outcomes and
impacts of the program.
Targeting issues of the large scale, government-based Mexican PES program have
partially motivated the need for program reconfiguration towards local user-based schemes.
An additional driver for this trend comes from the empirical evidence in Chapter 4, which
sustains that user-based, smaller scale PES schemes claim more substantial impacts and
effectiveness than government-based large scale PES programs. The transition from
government-based towards user-based PES schemes, however, is complex. I have found
scant commentary in the environmental policy literature. Therefore, in Chapter 6 I examine
the Mexican Fondos Concurrentes Program, which is a subset of the large scale
government-based PES program and is viewed as a transition towards user-based, and
market creation approach at the local level. Furthermore, I evaluate a pilot project in
western Mexico at the La Primavera Forest, Ejido San Agustín, in order to illustrate the
main issues and policy-making opportunities that are emerging from this innovative
program. Finally, in Chapter 7, conclusions and policy recommendations are drawn.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
In the 1990´s, Payment for Environmental Services (PES) appeared as an innovative
market-based policy instrument for natural resource conservation. From then, it expanded
throughout most Latin American countries. After a decade of PES implementation, the
empirical evidence regarding PES impact and effectiveness in Latin America is still
diffused and inconclusive. Before we can evaluate the effectiveness and policy implications
of PES, we must understand both its design and its implementation processes. Therefore, in
this chapter I review the PES literature regarding five key issues: PES scheme and program
design; the political economy of Payment for Environmental Services; market and
government failures associated with PES implementation; PES program effectiveness
determinants, and distributional issues regarding PES. Once these aspects have been
addressed, in the next chapter I explore the effects of the Mexican government-based PES
program within the developing world context of Latin America.
The key question that environmental policy has engendered in the last 10 years is:
Have PES schemes as public policy interventions changed the behavior of landowners
where the environmental services are provided? Or, would landowners have protected the
ecosystem regardless of intervention? A more subtle discussion has evolved around the
question of whether “forest conservation on enrolled land is undermined by displacement of
deforestation to other areas through spillover effects” (Alix-Garcia et al; 2010; Pattanayak,
2010). Proponents of PES schemes claim that behavioral change is nurtured through the
intervention while skeptics argue that potential and actual barriers (what they call
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“leakages”) mitigate the effectiveness of the program. In the middle of this debate,
practitioners, policy-makers, and scholars try to identify ways in which leakages of PES
schemes could be minimized through careful consideration of institutional context, design,
and implementation.
PES has become popular in developing world contexts because it is seen as a new
paradigm for solving the problem for ecosystem degradation (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002). In
particular, proponents of PES see it as a better course for environmental policy due to
several potential advantages: cost-effectiveness, institutional simplicity, and poverty
reduction. (Wunder et al; 2008). Each of these advantages is based mainly on theoretical
grounds. In practice, though, institutional constraints and bureaucratic and implementation
failures may hinder their effectiveness.
Under some circumstances, PES intervention has proven more cost-effective than
traditional command-and-control instruments such as designating natural protected areas.
PES design reflects the famous Coase theorem regarding social costs: if property rights are
well defined, a Pareto efficient outcome will be achieved regardless of the initial
distribution of benefits. Moreover, this result will be achieved without government
intervention. Two crucial assumptions underlie Coase´s theorem: property rights must be
well-defined, and transaction costs of the bargaining process should be low. How far away
are these theoretical assumptions from actual PES design and implementation? These
central research questions seeks empirical evidence and dominates the contemporary
Payment for Environmental Services academic literature. Another key feature of PES
design is that it is based on the beneficiary-pays rather than on the polluter-pays principle.
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This change in notion implies a significant shift in traditional command-and-control
environmental policy.
Payment for Environmental Services Schemes Design
According to Wunder et al. (2008), whose work represents the most generally
accepted PES characterization among scholars, a Payment for Environmental Service
scheme must contain three of the following five features. First, and similarly to other
market-based instruments, a voluntary transaction must take place. Typically, there are four
economic agents that might interact on a PES transaction: private owners, nongovernmental organizations, firms, and governments. Any interactive combination of these
four agents in a given scheme must be voluntarily. This is true even in the case of
government-based PES programs. Second, and closely interrelated with the voluntary
transaction condition, the environmental service (ES) must be bought by a (minimum one)
ES buyer and, third, from a (minimum one) ES provider. Fourth, the ES must be welldefined (well-defined, in this case, the causal chain between the environmental resource
and the service it provides is scientifically proven and ideally measured). Sometimes this
relationship is not easy to establish either because little is known about the ES or because it
is almost impossible to isolate a single ES from its ecosystem interactions. Despite this
limitation, there are four conventional environmental services implemented in both
developed and developing world contexts that scientists and policy makers agree on both
the provision of service and the associated causal chain. These environmental services are
carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation, hydrological services, and agro-forestry
environmental services.
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The fifth characteristic is conditionality and it refers to the assurance that the ES
supplier guarantees the environmental service provision. Conditionality implies that the ES
provider must comply with the agreed upon rules that are typically set in a given contract
and which norm the behavior of the landowner towards the natural resource in order to
guarantee provision of the environmental service for a definite time period.
In addition to these five main characteristics, PES schemes may be differentiated by the
“type and scale of ES demand, the payment source, the type of activity paid for, the
performance measure used, as well as the payment mode and amount” (Engel et al; 2008).
Consequently, the effectiveness and efficiency of PES schemes crucially depends on their
design.
Although Wunder’s five-step definition has been broadly accepted and agreed upon by
the environmental management scholarly community (as indicated by the number of
citations), there is some disagreement about whether to include environmental policies that
have PES characteristics but partially violate one or more of the five defining conditions
(Sommerville et al; 2009).
A key difference between PES schemes involves the nature of the buyer of the ES.
Government-based or supply-side PES schemes compensate ES providers in the form of a
Pigouvian subsidy. NGO’s may also apply supply-side PES schemes. On the other hand,
demand-side, also known as user-based schemes, imply that the compensation payment
might be made to the ES receiver who is able to identify the direct benefits of the
environmental service. Frequently, environmental services are ignored, underestimated, or
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neglected by users, unless the scale and the consequences are directly perceived by the user.
Watersheds with upstream and downstream users are a good example of this situation.
Drawing a sample of developed and developing world countries, Wunder et al. (2008)
found that user-based and government-financed PES schemes have significant differences
in terms of concrete performance indicators such as targeting; tailoring to local conditions
and needs; monitoring and enforcement to achieve conditionality; and confounding
objectives. In these four aspects, user-based schemes performed significantly better, on
average. The policy implications of this key finding don’t necessarily condemn government
PES schemes to failure, nor do they suggest that user-based schemes are always the best
way to go. A combination of both kinds of schemes may interact simultaneously, with the
institutional setting determining which type of scheme might work better in a given space
and time.
In practice, PES schemes may encompass a bundle of two or three environmental
services at the same time. For instance, Asquith et al found that in Los Negros, Bolivia, a
PES scheme compensated upstream farmers for not cutting down trees, hunting, or clearing
forest on enrolled lands while downstream irrigators paid for upstream cloud forest
conservation. Since the payment is an annual quid pro quo in-kind compensation scheme
that includes “transferring beehives supplemented by apicultural training” (Asquith et al;
2008) to upstream farmers, a third environmental service in the form of pollination is
considered in this complex scheme.
In general, bundling different environmental services is a frequent, advantageous
practice that seeks to simplify information within a complex ecosystem context. If well
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designed, a bundled PES scheme may provide benefits by expanding potential markets and
increasing payments to a particular area. Services are either sold together or subdivided and
marketed to different buyers (Kemkes et al; 2010). It may also be argued that bundling
environmental services fosters participation since it increases the scope of the potential
targeted population. Despite these potential advantages, especially if care is not taken in
design, bundling may increase transaction costs and increase leakages if “each service has a
different spatial distribution and therefore different beneficiaries”. (Kemkes et al; op. cit.).
The Political Economy of Payment for Environmental Services
Contemporary Payment for Environmental Services schemes utilize Coasian and
Pigouvian insights. According to the Coase Theorem, if property rights are well defined,
social and private return rates should be equal. Therefore, an efficient outcome could be
achieved regardless of the initial allocation of those rights. The efficient outcome is
achieved by bargaining between the two economic agents. For this to happen, transaction
costs should be low and the number of participants should also be low. Ex ante government
intervention is limited to make sure that property rights are well defined. Ex post
government participation is limited to put in place conflict resolution mechanisms for
potential disputes which, under Coasian conditions, shouldn’t normally occur.
As the number of participants increases, however, collective action issues may
appear. However, experimental economics literature has shown that the efficient outcome
suggested by Coase may still hold even when the number of participants is relatively high.
According to Hoffman and Spitzer (1986), the main conditions for the efficient outcome to
hold even under a bigger than two person scenario are the capability of players –bargainers-
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to have open communication, side payments and enforceable contracts. Well-defined
property rights are the cornerstone of Coase’s theorem. However, there is a vast literature in
natural resources that distinguishes between de facto and de jure property rights. Coase
refers to the former, while the latter are not considered under the theorem but may be
equally important regarding natural resource management (Baland and Platteau, 2003).
Payment for Environmental Services programs that are government-designed also
have a Pigouvian component. In a way, Payment for Ecosystem Services may be seen as a
particular form of a Pigouvian subsidy. This kind of market-based policy instrument
basically tries to identify the equilibrium price where social marginal benefits and costs
meet, thereby correcting for a negative externality; (for example, excessive pollution levels)
or augmenting production levels to ensure the optimal provision of positive externalities.
Similar to a Pigouvian tax, the key challenge for governments is to set the level of the
subsidy equal to the “price” at which marginal benefit and cost curves intersect. If this is
not achieved, suboptimal results will emerge as a consequence and deadweight loss as well.
Sometimes, PES schemes are a Coasian-Pigouvian combination. User-based and
government-based PES schemes both imply a voluntary transaction between one provider
and at least one buyer or consumer of the ES. However, under user-based schemes the
buyer clearly identifies the externality and directly bargains and pays for the service
without government intervention. In this sense, user-based schemes mimic the Coasian idea
more closely. In addition, the key low transaction cost Coasian condition has different
implications for user-based and government-based schemes. For example, it has been
shown through case studies that user-based schemes have lower transaction costs than do
government-based schemes (Wunder, 2008). This finding is not surprising since
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government based schemes lend themselves more to “leakages” via middle man interaction,
program design, timing, side goals, and program service delivery.
Another implicit assumption of the Coase Theorem is that the economic agents
engaged in bargaining are single units, typically private firms or individuals. However,
many natural resources in developing world contexts are appropriated, provided, or
managed in the form of common pool resource governance systems (Ostrom, 1990). This
circumstance shifts the basic assumptions of the Coase Theorem in a context where all sorts
of collective action issues may show up. Additionally, and since the theoretical
assumptions of the Coase Theorem –well-defined property rights, low transaction costs,
few participants or small groups and no wealth effects- are difficult to achieve in practice,
the bulk of the PES literature proposes alternative frameworks which take into account
institutional contexts and settings where PES schemes may take place, such as
distributional issues, uncertainty, social embeddedness, and power relations (Muradian et
al; 2010). These frameworks do not directly challenge the Coase Theorem’s usefulness
regarding PES-scheme design. Rather, they contest efficiency, the basic criterion of the
theorem, as the only criterion for defining objectives and measuring performance.
Although PES has thrived as a market-based policy instrument par excellence, it is
frequently the state- and community-based institutions, both formal and informal, that
determine its success. Vatn (2010) argues that some PES schemes are nothing more than a
“reconfiguration of the role of public bodies and communities becoming core
intermediaries or buyers”. The critical role of the state regarding regulation of property
rights on the participant lands, strong participation of public agencies in many PES
schemes worldwide, and the facilitation of these agencies for creating markets in the
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environmental realm are all factors that have to be considered for the “market-based”
discussion (Vatn, 2010).
Not all contributors to the PES literature agree with the feasibility of applying the
Coase Theorem to the environmental realm, particularly PES. In particular, the ecological
economics approach, which differs theoretically in many ways from the neoclassical
environmental economics approach, states that Wunder’s five main characteristics of an
environmental service are not only unattainable in practice but also inappropriate in some
cases. This argument hinges on the very definition of environmental services, which, for the
ecological economics school, is as follows: “PES is a transfer of resources between social
actors, which aims to create incentives to align individual and/or collective land use
decisions with the social interest in the management of natural resources” (Farley &
Costanza, 2010).

Implications of this definition are non-trivial. If the ecological economics approach
is followed, distributional goals could potentially hold more weight than efficiency goals.
Moreover, the instruments to achieve environmental public goods will follow more
Pigouvian and state-based approaches rather than Coasian criteria. It is important to note
that neither of these approaches explicitly considers the critical role that communitarian
rules might play in PES design such as social norms and preferences towards public
intervention.

Some authors have recently called attention to the inconsistency of governmentbased PES schemes in that a government-based policy is, in principle, incompatible with
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the market-based mechanisms that it tries to promote (Fletcher & Breitling, 2012). This
structural incompatibility may be one of the reasons for eventual implementation failure
and leakages. According to Sommerville et al (2010), “PES-like” schemes –the ones that
aren’t completely voluntary transactions- are often considered inferior compared to those
that comply with all the delineated characteristics, especially the voluntary aspect.
However, the same authors argue that the focus should not be placed on the strict definition
of the term and its characteristics but rather on a more flexible definition “best seen as an
umbrella term for a set of resource-management tools that are based on the philosophy of
implementing conditional positive incentives in a wide variety of institutional contexts”
(Sommerville et al; 2009; op. cit.).

Effectiveness and Leakages of Government-Based PES Schemes
PES literature offers two main pathways to measure effectiveness and efficiency of PES
schemes. On the one hand, Wunder proposes a comparative framework between schemes
which includes seven transaction costs-related variables: baselines and scenarios;
opportunity costs; additionality; land use service link; leakages; permanence; and start-up
and recurrent transaction costs (Wunder et al; 2008). Each of these variables influences the
potential effectiveness of a given PES scheme. For example, the higher the opportunity
costs, the more carefully implemented a PES scheme should be in order to correctly
compensate the potential enrolled participant. Failure to do so will lead to greater leakages,
since shirking may appear as a consequence of imprecise opportunity costs definition.
Inclusion of these variables may paint a more accurate picture of potential leakages and
spillovers of a given scheme. The inductive nature of this approach is helpful in identifying
leakages at the design and implementation phases of a given scheme.
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Pattanayak (2010) argues that this kind of typology is useful for descriptive purposes
although insufficient to measure real impacts of the actual implementation of the program
in terms of additionality. In order to reach the next level –impact measurement- it is
necessary to apply impact evaluation techniques that account for additionality and
effectiveness by controlling confounding variables and thereby responding to the basic
evaluation question: What would have happened in the absence of the intervention?
(Pattanayak, 2010).
A second approach that dominates the PES literature regarding the effectiveness of PES
is a matrix diagram proposed by Engel et al. (2009). According to this approach,
effectiveness of a PES scheme can be evaluated by comparing the value of environmental
services. The most frequent and interesting possibilities are the ones that provide solutions
that imply trade-offs between land use and environmental service benefits. Taking these
trade-offs into account in designing PES schemes should improve efficiency. For example,
PES schemes that offer potentially high environmental services value but low on-site
profits for the private landowner are “leakage prone,” since, other things being equal, the
enrolled participant will always tend to deviate to improve its private benefit at the expense
of a social (environmental) cost. Given the heterogeneity of available empirical data from
PES cases in the developing world, Wunder’s and Engel’s proposed methods are useful in
identifying the potential characteristics of a given PES scheme design. Consideration of
these attributes allows for better identification of the variables that might inhibit or foster
program impacts. In other words, it is crucial to identify which variables favor spillovers or
leakages.
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Another leakage source for government-based schemes is incomplete contracts.
Conditionality necessarily requires a contract between the environmental service user and
the provider. As in any contract, but especially those concerning environmental issues, it is
very difficult to include all the terms, conditions, and possible consequences of the
provided environmental service (Barzel,1997; Williamson, 1985).Moreover, there is a
trade-off between simplicity of the contract and the omission of details that might be
important. There might also be a bias against the poorest households, those that are
unfamiliar with technical language, and who just sign off with little knowledge of the
consequences and commitments surrounding the contract.
It has been shown that asymmetric information is a recurrent source of market
failure under typical PES schemes. Normally, the environmental service provider has better
information than the environmental buyer–including governments-regarding the conditions
and management of their natural resources. This asymmetry may be used to advantage by
providers in order to obtain “informational rents.” If a significant number of participants in
the program use informational rents, program effectiveness and additionality will be
reduced. Contract design is therefore a key instrument in potentially reducing asymmetric
information. There are several ways to tackle asymmetric information and therefore reduce
the leakages of a given program. Ferraro identifies three concrete mechanisms for this: “1)
acquire information on observable landowner attributes that are correlated with compliance
costs; 2) offer landowners a menu of screening contracts; and 3) allocate contracts through
procurement auctions” (Ferraro, 2008). While the first option is the most standardized and
used in different PES schemes, the second one implies a great deal of creativity and
flexibility by the ES buyer. The third option is less common due to political difficulties.
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The goal of each of these approaches is “to reduce informational rents without distorting
the level of environmental services provided.” Which scheme is better greatly depends on
the institutional context in which it will be placed. For instance, the third approach implies
a sophisticated setting of community-level information and bureaucratic practices.
The contract period is also very important. There is a debate regarding the optimal
time period a contract should encompass in order to ensure that the environmental service
continues to be provided even after contract termination. This may imply a behavioral
change from the ES provider. The experimental economics literature depicts a vast set of
situations where participants of the environmental service scheme may fail to comply
despite what is established on the contract. Credible commitment issues may appear once a
contract is terminated. In other words, they may not be “morally” committed to preserving
the ES once the agreement is enacted.
In many cases, the goal of environmental services conservation is not just to restrain
people from using the natural resource base. It may also imply a series of actions or
practices towards sustainability that aren’t necessarily appraised, embraced, or appropriated
by the ES supplier once participation in the program is finished. Ultimately, a crucial goal
of any PES program is to achieve a behavioral change among former program participants.
The hope is that they will become pro-conservationists and environmentally educated in
such a way that they might develop their own sustainable economic and environmental long
term plans.
Another important leakage regarding PES design is known as slippage. Although
individual compliance might be sufficiently high for some communities as a result of
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participating in the program; neighbor communities may change their behavior adversely
regarding program goals (Shapiro, 2010). Higher deforestation rates from neighbor
communities, for example, may offset lower deforestation rates from participating
beneficiaries.
At the implementation level, bureaucratic or government failures may also influence
PES effectiveness. If several agencies carry out a given program, coordination is needed.
Moreover, if different government levels are involved, legal and institutional frameworks
must be fine-tuned. Pattanayak et al (2010) warn about the multiagency issue. Because each
agency might play a specific role in the program and therefore has a vested interest on it,
inefficiency may come as a result (Pattanayak, 2010; Libecap, 2006). For instance, in the
Mexican PES case, a forest development agency is responsible for running the program
while the water federal agency collects the fees and revenues that are used for funding the
PES program. Simultaneous program participation by beneficiaries may also be a
government failure that reduces potential impacts of the program and raises transaction
costs at the implementation level. This is especially true for programs whose incentives are
not aligned, thereby sending mixed and contrary signals to program participants.
A crucial factor in avoiding leakages of any PES scheme, thereby augmenting its
effectiveness, is the development of a baseline to compare ex ante and ex post results. If
baseline data is incomplete or poorly developed, it is very difficult to estimate impacts
accurately. Geographical information systems may provide a substitute or complement as a
resource for creating baseline data.
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A key factor for the success or failure of a government-based PES program
implementation is the middleman who works directly with the participant community at all
stages of the program. In the absence of efficiency wages and/or low skills, intermediaries
are prone to shirk in the form of weak supervision or collusion with the PES provider. This
issue leads to leakages from the program. Obviously, the intermediary leakage is reduced
when skilled intermediaries are already in place, but this is often not the case, so training is
crucial. Another way to improve intermediation performance is by utilizing existing
nonprofit organizations as intermediaries. Yet another way under user-based PES schemes
is to take advantage of the participation of the users in a group organization, such as a local
utility department that lets users “make a payment through an additional fee on their bill”
(Kemkes et al; 2010). Ceteris paribus, the nearest potential participants with lower learning
curves will be favored by the middleman. Bribing in the form of “unofficial tips” may be
another source for inefficiency and participation bias. There are several ways to tackle the
middleman issue: sound training; efficiency wages; and the implementation of quotas that
favor minorities and reduce potential poverty biases. Despite its importance, the middleman
or intermediary issue is scantly addressed in the PES literature. Pascual et al. (2010)
maintain that the bargaining power of both the agents and the intermediary or middle man
critically influence the performance, and hence the effectiveness and additionality, of PES
schemes (Pascual et al; 2010).
Other leakages may arise when PES beneficiaries are communities rather than
individuals. There is a vast literature that studies common pool resources dynamics as well
as the risks and opportunities that communitarian arrangements offer (Ostrom, 1990). The
fact that an agreed-upon contract takes place between a public sponsor and a community in
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order to guarantee and preserve conditions for ES provision tells us very little about the
internal dynamics of the community itself and, ultimately, which outcomes and impacts
will be generated as a consequence. Local rules of use may be incompatible with PES
program requirements. Internal agreements or disagreements within communities may
hinder or scale up program outcomes and impacts. For example, by comparing the design
and implementation of three different programs in Cambodia, Clements et al. (2010) found
that PES program effectiveness was significantly greater where local rules of use were
taken into account (Clements et al; 2010). The mechanisms of this inclusion were through
local institutions empowerment and intrinsic motivation reinforcement. The latter aspect
addresses the “crowding out” market failure that occurs when there is a gap between a
community’s intrinsic motivation and government or market-based logic. Crowding out
occurs because “introducing monetary incentives can undermine collective action that is
motivated by social norms” (Kerr, 2012). Because payments may introduce a purely
instrumental or utilitarian logic that disrupts environmental virtues that were historically
practiced by local communities, crowding out may appear even under conditions where the
scheme was set properly and according to market principles (Vatn, 2010). There are not
Pareto efficient cases where, in addition to no additionality being made, the landowner acts
as a poorer steward of the natural resources than before the program was implemented. This
phenomenon is known as “crowding out” because government programs crowd out former
institutional arrangements (Cardenas, 2000).
If PES beneficiaries hold property in common, the three factors that are stressed by
Ostrom (1990) directly apply to PES schemes, namely, institutional supply, credible
commitment, and monitoring. Externally, and due to asymmetric information and
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incomplete contracts, the ES buyer monitors the accomplishment of predefined goals
regarding the environmental service. Internally, and at a communitarian level, another set
of rules to ensure monitoring are required to comply with the environmental goal as defined
in the transaction. Good communitarian monitoring, based on trust, punishment, and
informal interactions are crucial to PES scheme compliance.
At first glance, if a participant community does not comply with predefined rules, it
seems reasonable that they be admonished or ejected from the program. The payment then
would go to a community that shows more potential to attain program goals with the
respective transferring and transaction costs. However, in some cases it might be more
productive to identify the main drivers from the non-compliant communities. Perhaps they
share characteristics with other ex ante rejected or non-participant communities that have
not participated in the program, yet have similar weighting on providing and preserving the
environmental service at the relevant unit of analysis. Therefore, if we explore and gain a
better understanding of the nature and characteristics of the local dynamics drivers, the
consequent knowledge generated might be used for PES program or scheme redesign in
terms of contracting, monitoring, and, ultimately, goal achievement.
Taking account of communitarian dynamics is crucial for PES scheme performance.
This is especially true when the benefits of the scheme are transferred to communities that
either hold land in common or where the environmental service is associated or is perceived
by the community to be a public good. In these cases, “there is a danger of cooption of
benefits by subgroups within the community that leads to widespread disillusionment”
(Sommerville et al, 2010). Alternatively, those who receive the transfer as representatives
of the community may apply informal command and control internal policies or patronage
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practices in order to manage their program performance as a group. In a way, these
practices countervail the original spirit of the program which is incentive-based and market
driven.
All in all, the literature on PES focuses on ways in which additionality levels
become high and leakage effects remain low (Wunder, 2008). It is not uncommon to find
cases in which participating landowners’ behavior is not altered by the implementation of
the program. If this is the case, then the program or PES scheme is not really adding to the
preservation of the natural resource that provides the ES. Another way to consider
additionality is what happens after the PES contract is terminated. In theory, ES providers
should behave post PES as if they were still participating in the program. For this to
happen, long term behavior must be altered in such a strong way that it changes
preferences, values, or cultural attitudes. If this does not happen, then we can say that
additionality is not obtained. (Pattanayak, 2010). Rather, beneficiaries of the program made
sustainable practices in order to receive program benefits while they were enrolled, yet
endurance wasn’t developed to guarantee long term results.
Lack of additionality in a PES program may have several behavioral implications.
First, there is a debate on how much time is needed before a behavioral or preference
change is made, assuming that the ES suppliers did not already have a consistent PES
behavior (Bowles, 2008). If all other market failures are addressed but Payment for
Ecosystem Services is directed to beneficiaries who would have conserved the ES supply in
the absence of the program, it is just a transfer without positive net impacts. Therefore, it is
crucial to efficiently target the object population under a scheme where participants need to
realize a tangible environmental benefit.
22

Preconditions for Payment for Environmental Services Schemes
As argued by Engel et al; careful design is critical for PES efficiency and effectiveness.
Consequently, program design should be aligned with the institutional and social
preconditions that prevail within the targeted population context. The question then
becomes, should PES schemes respond to the preconditions that already exist in a given
context, or, should PES schemes foster desirable conditions that have not yet been put in
place?
Considering local communitarian dynamics is especially important under a weak
institutional context. As Engel and Palmer (2008) demonstrate for the case of Indonesia,
PES schemes that are not carefully developed to account for communitarian dynamics may
be counterproductive in their outcomes. For example, where logging communities do not
have clearly defined property rights (even after decentralization) and, at the same time,
there is economic pressure from logging companies to obtain timber, a standardized PES
scheme that ignores local informal dynamics may merely serve as a leverage negotiation
tool for informal landowners to get better deals with logging companies (Engel & Palmer,
2008). This is a good illustration of what Ostrom calls policy prescriptions as “the only
way” referring to the common mistake that environmental policy makers make when they
deem the prisoner’s dilemma, the tragedy of the commons or Olson’s group theory as the
only possible results when collective action issues arise (Ostrom, 1990). If a PES scheme is
implemented in a market-based structure without first understanding of local rules in use,
then the natural resource management outcomes may well be worse than no intervention at
all. Furthermore, such a scenario may also lead to a “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin,
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1968). In this sense, public intervention may hinder self-enforcement mechanisms that
work at the informal level in local communities and result in positive outcomes.
In the same vein, Kosoy et al (2007) found evidence in Central America that PES
schemes may serve as an environmental conflict-resolution mechanism between upstream
and downstream environmental service users and providers (Kosoy et al; 2007). Other
scholars like Cranford and Mourato (2011), suggest that PES are more effective if designed
and implemented in a “two-stage approach.” This means that a community-based
environmental management (CBEM) approach should be implemented in the first stage in
order to foster education, alternatives, and social consensus. Such preconditions might be
followed by the typical incentive-based mechanisms under which a traditional PES scheme
works (Cranford & Mourato, 2011). These kinds of preconditions (cognitive, alternative,
and social agreements) differ from market preconditions, such as property rights definition,
financial markets, or contracts that are typically discussed. From the policy perspective, one
drawback of the two-stage approach is timing. Robust knowledge and potential change at
the first stage might take a great deal of time and thus be incompatible with policy agendas.
However, at least taking into account the communitarian variables at the first stage might
improve further design, implementation, and effectiveness of a given PES scheme.
In the two-stage approach, the government has several roles. First, it is responsible for
ensuring that preconditions hold, that is, guaranteeing that property rights are well defined
and encroachment is punished and enforced. Second, it collaborates to maintain low
transaction costs. Third, it develops a legal and institutional context, such that flexible
schemes may be put in place without need of complex reforms. Fourth, it certifies sound
environmental practices under potential user-based PES schemes.
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Consequences of incomplete preconditions on eventual program implementation are
uncertain. If the potential target population is sufficiently large, there might be a bias
against the poorest households (those lacking the preconditions to participate). Following
the Coase Theorem, clear property rights definition is a basic pre-condition. However, in
many developing countries where the PES operates, property rights for potential
participants are ill-defined, especially for the poorest households. Although not properly a
market failure, this inconsistency may have important distributional consequences.
Preconditions are important to ensure the development of any PES scheme. For
instance, if property rights are not well defined, interchange and bargaining between buyers
and sellers of the environmental service simply cannot take place. Given the fact that many
developing world countries have incomplete property rights definition at a national scale, it
is common for PES programs to be targeted to geographical units where there are enough
potential participants that possess with the basic preconditions of a PES program.
Distributional Issues of Payment for Environmental Services Programs
Distributional issues are often overlooked in the PES literature. This is not surprising
since, following the Coase Theorem, it doesn´t matter what the initial allocation of property
rights is, as long as it is well defined and transaction costs are negligible. The problem with
relying on the Coase Theorem is that the initial allocation of property rights might be very
unequal. Hence, the bargaining power of the involved economic agents isn´t the same. This
feature of the Coase Theorem has led some authors in the PES literature to argue in favor of
equity and to question efficiency as the sole criterion for PES-scheme design. Even under
efficiency grounds, distribution matters if potential win-win situations regarding poverty
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alleviation and environmental service provision are to be achieved. These situations are not
uncommon considering the potential trade-off deep connection between environmental
sustainability and alleviating poverty environment and poverty that prevails in many
developing world contexts
Pascual et al (2010) go one step further and argue that not only is equity advisable
under win-win PES scheme contexts that seek for efficiency as the main goal and poverty
alleviation or another distributional rule as a by-product (Pascual et al; 2010), but also that
PES schemes should aim for equity even when equity is achieved at the expense of some
efficiency (the classical efficiency-equity trade-off). This tradeoff in favor of equity is
justified by fairness procedural reasons in order to break up power imbalance among the
social groups involved and to address path dependence issues and bias against poorest
households. Typically, these programs have a high income bias, since the existence of
clearly defined property rights is associated with higher income levels. Hence, there is a
bias against the poorest amongst the poor (Muñoz, 2008). Other experiences have shown
that the mere existence of PES schemes might encourage nonparticipants and local
governments to speed up property rights definition and certification processes in order to
become participants in the future (Sommerville et al; 2010).
A second key precondition is minimum poverty levels thresholds. Very poor
communities are automatically excluded from participation in the program since they are
incapable of complying with all the requisites that participation demands. Some of these
communities live very close to the forests from which they make their livings. Some of
them apply sustainable practices; some of them do not. Therefore, if the PES scheme does
not include a component that addresses the lowest income households, who happen to live
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in areas where significant environmental services are provided, conservation success at a
global scale might be hindered.
Much of the literature says that PES programs should not have only a single
environmental goal, especially in developing world contexts (Pagiola, 2005). Depending on
contextual circumstances, a sound PES program may also contribute to social benefits in
addition to ES preservation. The most popular side goal found in the PES literature is
poverty alleviation. Defenders of this approach say that, because a significant number of
PES beneficiaries are poor and live within marginalized areas, a well-targeted PES program
may contribute to both goals simultaneously: ES supply and poverty alleviation.
Not everybody agrees with the idea of including poverty alleviation and/or other side
goals in government PES programs (Landell-Mills et al; 2002; Kerr, 2002). The argument
stresses the fact that there are already too many market failures and potential leakages
surrounding PES schemes in developing world contexts. Adding yet another goal
component to a given program would further reduce its chance of success. The more side
goals that are added to a program, the more difficult it will be to manage. Side goals, reduce
flexibility and divert focus from key issues of PES programs such as additionality.
Therefore, according to this view, a sound PES program should limit its scope to
environmental service provision regardless of distributional and equity concerns. In this
sense, the only concern of an efficient PES should be the achievement of Pareto efficient
levels. Adding side goals to a PES program implies a detour to the main efficiency goal of
an environmental service provision. Policy-makers and some economists are attracted by
the idea that poverty alleviation can be met through environmental service provision.
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CHAPTER 3
EJIDOS AND PAYMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES PROGRAMS
Roughly 80 percent of Mexican forests are owned by social and institutional
arrangements known as Ejidos (Muñoz Piña, et al; 2003). Moreover, 90 percent of
Mexico´s Payment for Environmental Services (PES) recipients are also ejidatarios, people
who live under Ejidos. Therefore, in order to evaluate the effectiveness of PES programs in
Mexico, it is crucial to understand the basic dynamics of the Ejido.
This chapter has two parts: first I present a short, general background of the
structure and functionality of Ejidos. Next, to illustrate how Ejidos interact with
environmental policy interventions, I explore how Ejidos have responded to command and
control policies (in the form of natural protected areas) and market-based policies (in the
form of PES). In doing so, I use various primary and secondary data sources.
An Ejido is a property-rights institution that was developed after the Mexican
Revolution of 1910. There is no agreed-upon definition for “Ejido,” although its main
characteristics help to conceptualize it. First, Ejidos are at least partially commonly-held.
There might be sections within the Ejido that are parcelized or individualized for
individual, small landholders. An Ejido’s governmental structure somewhat mimics the
Mexican federal government system. It’s formal governance structure has three
components: a president, who is elected every three years and might be re-elected every
three years; an assembly Asamblea Ejidal in which all members participate and make
collective decisions; and a surveillance committee, which is tasked with making sure that
the agreed-upon arrangements are complied with and self-enforced at the Ejido level. This
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ejido commissary comisario ejidal is a liaison or representative between a group of Ejidos
and local and regional governments and programs.
The original landholders in the Ejido system were families of peasants. Until 1992,
Ejidos weren’t allowed to sell their land, only rent it in usufruct. Moreover, land transfers
were only allowed to occur via direct inheritance to Ejido members’ children. However, it
has always been the case that an Ejido’s assembly may incorporate additional members to
the Ejido in the form of posesionarios (possessors), usually extended family members or
kin who are allowed to work or rent common lands but lack voting rights in the Ejido’s
decisions. In practice, though, “posesionarios often farm on Ejido lands ceded or rented by
others or illegally taken from the commons,” (Jennifer, A. et al; 2005). This leads to
encroachment and potential conflict between Ejidos or between an Ejido and private
owners. To make matters worse, presidential decrees throughout the 20th century gradually
expanded the amount of land under the Ejido ownership regimen. In some cases, the same
land has been granted more than once. In other cases, privately-owned land has been
claimed by Ejido groups citing past presidential decrees. These situations have led to
encroachment and, in some states, to social conflict among those seeking land ownership.
The Ejido is one of Mexico’s land tenure regimes, and it accounts for 57 percent of
the country’s arable land (Thompson, 1994). An Ejido property unit typically contains a
number of individual landholdings along with a portion of commonly-held land. Ejido
members have their own governance mechanisms in order to make decisions regarding
inclusion and exclusion, renting or selling part or all the land, and production and
participation. In terms of program participation in a PES program, each Ejido develops an
ecosystem service project to be considered by The National Forest Commission. Three
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possible outcomes are possible: projects that were approved, projects that were presented
but not approved, eligible communities that chose not to participate. Kosoy calls the
determinants of participation “Factors that affect eligibility to participate, desire to
participate and ability to participate in the program” (Kosoy, 2008). Therefore, one way to
predict the PES incidence in poverty is to focus on ex ante participation conditions and the
procedural processes that occur before potentially applying to the program. Another way to
find out if Mexican PES programs can improve targeting is to focus on the internal
decision-making analysis and perceptions that different Ejido communities have towards
PES and, ultimately, towards environmental management.
One of the main preconditions for market- and non-market-based forest policy is the
existence of well-defined property rights. For the Mexican context, structural reforms were
put in place during the nineties in order to organize the land market. Constitutional reforms
were undertaken, a new agrarian law was crafted, and a property certification system was
created for Ejidos. Typically, the land that is held in common within Ejidos is forest land.
This is so because parcels that are already used for agricultural purposes are exploited first.
If economic conditions worsen, there is more pressure for the common forest to be
deforested and adapted to agriculture and livestock (Merino Juarez, 2003).
Following the Mexican Revolution and subsequent land redistributions, nearly half
of the arable land was controlled by Ejidos. The Ejidos fall into three main categories: (1)
parcelized, (2) partially parcelized and partially-held as communal land, and (3) all
communally-held land. From the Revolution to the land reforms of 1992, the national
government placed strict limitations on what Ejidos could and could not do with their land.
Ejido owners, known as ejidatarios, often ignored land-use restrictions and engaged in de
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facto rental and leasing obligations (Thompson & Wilson, op. cit.).

Market forces

overcame the restrictions, and the government eventually legalized such transactions with
the 1992 reforms, which were a comprehensive set of constitutional and legal changes that
provided ejidatarios with the prerogative to reallocate and trade land use and property from
the communal property regime to individual parcels and vice versa. As a result of the
reforms, (1) parcelized Ejido land can now be rented and sold, (2) corporations can own
land, and (3) foreign persons and corporations can own land outside restricted zones.
After 1992, important reforms were made to Mexico’s 27th Constitutional Article,
setting new rules for some of the most important Ejido decisions. The Ejido internal
governance structure and decision-making processes underwent important changes due to
these reforms. Ejido land market transactions were expected to increase significantly after
the 1992 reforms. However, conversion to individual ownership did not occur at the
expected level. Different scholars have studied the circumstances preventing parcelization.
For instance, Muñoz et al. (2003) identified four situations that may cause the ejiditarios to
choose the Common Pool Resource CPR over individual-property schemes: high expected
benefits from keeping the land in common administration (e.g., economies of scale in
production, mutual insurance), effective collective action (e.g., low cost of monitoring and
enforcement), a privatization cost that is higher than expected gains, and concerns with
distributional issues (i.e., stock and income)
One benefit of keeping land in common for Ejidos comes from the Mexican
government’s rural development and conservation-oriented programs. Overall, according to
the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OCDE), an Ejido may
obtain resources from as many as 27 public programs (OCDE, 2009). These programs are
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very diverse. Some of these programs were designed in the 1990’s to directly foster
agricultural production through subsidies. Others are matched grants. A third set of rural
development programs, which were more recently developed, try to incentivize sustainable
agricultural practices. The main conservation program from this latter group is Mexico’s
Payment for Environmental Services Program (PSA-Pro Arbol). This program is carried
out by Mexico’s National Forestry Commission (CNF), and it aims to prevent deforestation
in the country’s most overexploited aquifers by paying a subsidy to land owners –
communal and private- to keep their forest mostly untouched.
For those Ejidos whose common land is forested or located on a rich, biologically
diverse ecosystem (and thus, eligible to participate in conservation programs) there also
might be a set of individualized parcels suitable for crops such as corn and soybeans. These
parcels are therefore eligible to participate in agricultural, production-based programs.
Relative subsidies from both types of programs may lead to different conservationproduction behavior within a single Ejido. If subsidies are greater for typical agricultural
activities, a more intensive use of resources (soil, water, fertilizers, and electricity) will
occur in order to enhance agricultural productivity. In some cases, the incentive to produce
might be so high that it leads to Ejido rearrangements in order to make use of the
previously untouched common land or forest. If this is the case, the incentive will lead to
higher deforestation levels, either within a sustainable forestry and agricultural approach or
under a tragedy of the commons scenario, where Ejido members could not achieve agreedupon land usage rules. Another possibility is that the Ejido may develop a sustainable plan
to participate in public programs that combine common land conservation and sustainable
production on parcelized lands. Trade-offs between program objectives may arise.
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In some cases, collective-action problems faced by Ejidos have led to the classic
tragedy of the commons. In other cases, local institutional arrangements at the Ejido level
have succeeded in preserving the forest–maybe not in an optimal or efficient way, but
sustainable enough to avoid the tragedy of the commons. Payment for Environmental
Services are not framed to resolve internal collective action issues at the Ejido level.
However, they are intended to change economic behavior through compensation and
relative price compensation.
Ejidos and Natural Protected Areas
In order to explain potential conservation outcomes, it is necessary to add to the
institutional framework the interplay of Ejidos with other institutions, environmental laws,
and policies that have influenced Ejidos’ conservation decisions (Merino Juarez, 2003).
The three main command-and-control instruments used in the 1990s by the Mexican
government were: Natural protected areas decrees, official Mexican norms, and land-use
plans.
Natural Protected Areas initiatives in Mexico date back to the early seventies with
UNESCO’s Biosphere Reserve and United Nations Man and Biosphere (MAB) initiatives.
There were examples in the early 20th century; the Desierto de los Leones was designated
as the first national park in 1917 (Pare, 2007). Although a thorough description of natural
protected areas in Mexico is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is fair to say that, unlike
like United States’ national park models, the Mexican National Park Policy did not imply
displacement of local indigenous communities and Ejidos that where settled before the
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creation of national parks. Sometimes displacement was substituted by expropriation. In
other cases, ill-defined and informal de facto property-rights arrangements prevailed.
In essence, it is the interplay between an Ejido’s internal decisions –expanded and
clarified with recent reforms- and natural protected areas federal policy and local land-use
plans that determines the basic framework for an Ejido’s conservation decisions.
Furthermore, other stakeholders (NGOs, universities, or private corporations interested in
buying communal land, for example) shape conservation outcomes (Jardel, 1992). These
institutional arrangements do not necessarily conflict, but they certainly overlap with
convolute standardized international schemes such as UNESCO’s Biosphere Reserve
Initiatives. As of today, one hundred years after the Mexican Revolution, some Ejido land
still hasn’t been properly certified and remains under de facto property rights (Kosoy, et al;
2008).
Ejido-Government Interactions
The Ejidos’ annual deforestation rate of 1.4 percent is higher than the 1.2 percent
national rate, which includes all deforested land (Alix-Garcia et al; 2005). The differences
are mainly located in tropical forests in a few states, namely, Veracruz, Yucatan, Colima,
and Quintana Roo. Muñoz Piña (2003) estimated that it is approximately 10 percent less
likely for deforestation to occur when land is located inside a protected area. Most land
located inside or adjacent to protected areas is communal. The Muñoz results include all
types of forests around the country. While this result is statistically significant, the
coefficient is not very large. This limited impact may be explained by other socio-economic
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characteristics such as the poverty levels of communities living inside protected areas. In
other words, poverty and forest property among Ejidos are highly correlated.
In general, the main drivers for deforestation nationwide have been proximity to
cities and rural population centers, low slope, and soils appropriate for agriculture. None of
these three variables is completely removed under a protected area status. For instance,
illegal deforestation occurs on a regular basis on protected areas, located very close to large
cities, where real estate projects and sprawl occur at a fast growth rate with poor urban
planning. Under low enforcement conditions, protected areas could achieve worse results
in terms of sustainability than forest located in unprotected areas. In addition, there is
evidence that community enterprises formed by indigenous communities with very similar
governance schemes to those of the Ejidos compete with Ejidos in natural protected areas
natural protected area Ejidos in terms of conservation (Antinori & Barton Bray, 2005).
A key variable differentiating Ejido conservation behavior is wood permit tenure.
Only about a third of Ejidos hold permits allowing them to extract wood for sale. There are
significant behavioral differences between Ejido permit holders, and the data suggest that
Ejidos with a vertical organizational structure and larger amounts of capital goods, such as
machinery, tend to deforest less. Unfortunately, most Ejidos, both with or without permits,
are poor and have no access to credit markets.
The behavior of non-permit-holding Ejidos regarding deforestation lies in their own
collective-action capacity to avoid encroachment in the short term and the tragedy of the
Commons in the long term. Garcia points out that the key to avoiding these unsustainable
results lies in qualitative attributes of Ejido members. Young households with sufficient
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private land within large Ejidos as well as experienced leaders within small Ejidos are more
likely to avoid encroachment and overharvesting of common lands. There’s also some
evidence that non-rural income potential for Ejido communities is also an essential
determinant for common conservation purposes.
It is up to the Ejidos to obtain forestry permits. The underlying reasons why only
approximately one-third of them decide to apply for a permit remains a puzzle. One reason
might be the high transaction costs generated by governmental structures and institutional
arrangements. There is evidence from other programs and qualitative case studies
demonstrating that a community’s willingness to participate in these kinds of programs is
hindered by a long tradition of mistrusting government. This is not the case if the program
is tied to other entitlements (Kosoy et al; 2008).
Ejido Governance
The 1992 property rights reforms changed the makeup of Ejidos and thus altering
the way they make decisions. Before the 1992 reforms, decisions made by Ejidos were very
limited in terms of market transactions. After the reforms, Ejido market possibilities
expanded significantly. Now they are able to lease or rent their parcels after some legal
procedures. Due to the reforms, Ejidos are also able to use part of their parcelized
landholdings and even communal land within the Ejido as collateral for credit or to
associate with private corporations. Moreover, they can, with the approval of two-thirds of
the assembly, divide their common property into small private individual parcels. Finally,
they can accept new members. In sum, with the 1992 reforms, Ejidos became more flexible
organizations, able to incorporate some market and private-sector mechanisms (Merino
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Juarez, 2003). It is important to highlight the fact that, in order for an Ejido to make these
changes, it is first necessary to comply with the national certification program PROCEDE.
Then the Ejido assembly must be involved in the specific decision-making processes of the
Ejido. Ultimately, some of the changes derived from the Article 27 reforms might have a
direct connection with conservation decisions, such as the ability to divide communal land
into small parcels or to create partnerships with the private sector. This is especially
important for Ejidos that are located in the buffer zones of Biosphere Reserves.
Although there is currently not enough research to evaluate the changes in terms of
general patterns toward conservation nationwide, limited evidence from case studies shows
some interesting patterns. For instance, empirical evidence suggests that Ejidos, inside or
outside an NPA, will not be willing to sell, rent, or parcelize their common land. If
common land within the Ejido is relatively abundant on a per capita basis, there is a higher
probability of subdivision, sale or lease. However, most Ejidos located in Biosphere
Reserves are highly populated, in some cases with hundreds and even thousands of
members, and their common land subject to division is scarce or unattractive for economic
activity purposes due to the constraints of being in a protected area. The direction of these
variables regarding conservation outcomes is currently unknown. It might be that inaction
and deadlock come as a result of size, membership, and complex decision-making, thus
leaving the forest relatively unexploited (Thompson & Wilson, 1994). However, it might
also be the case that complex governance and economic necessity lead to overharvesting
and unsustainable behavior by biosphere Ejidos. More empirical evidence is needed.
The bottom line of this comparison between Ejidos, both inside and outside of
natural protected areas, is twofold. First, the natural protected area designation in Mexico,
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as in other countries, is just an initial step. It doesn’t guarantee that communities will
employ conservationist behavior. Actually, it is the underlying set of variables inside the
protected areas and communities such as park visitors, fire management, plagues, illegal
logging and poaching and real estate project development adjacent to natural protected
areas that explain conservation or overharvesting decisions. Second, well-managed
communities—ones that are able to internalize externalities, cut the middle man, receive
training, and develop a sound organizational structure—do not need to be within a natural
protected area to become conservationists. These communities already work to preserve
their environment and have sound ethics regarding sustainability. The modernization of the
Ejido sector in Mexico has been a necessary but insufficient condition for the development
of property rights, and the global conservation outcomes of these reforms are yet to be seen.
Ejidos and PES: A Preliminary User-Based Approach Evaluation.
Before analyzing the current effectiveness of PES programs in Mexico, it is
important to take into account the main drivers and ideas that are held towards the program
by its own beneficiaries. The main objective of this kind of analysis is to identify and depict
the variables that significantly promote or hinder effectiveness and additionality of PES
programs.
In order to develop hypotheses about the implementation of PES programs in
Mexico and the consequences in terms of participation, qualitative research was done.
Using a 2007 beneficiary program evaluation, the perceptions of participants in PSA-Pro
Arbol were analyzed. This survey was the largest evaluation that has been done of the PSAProArbol program to date. It was carried out by El Colegio de Postgraduados (Colpos), an
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academic institution located in the state of Mexico and specializing in rural development
and forestry issues. The COLPOS research evaluation project included stakeholder focus
groups, secondary sources analysis, and the development of a survey that was randomly
applied within a sample of 57 participants currently enrolled in the program. In addition,
they included in the survey some non-participants whose projects were rejected, but these
respondents do not represent a direct pairwise match with respect to the above-mentioned
participants.
This analysis focused on the open-ended questions included at the end of the
survey. Typically, in these kinds of program evaluations, evaluators focus exclusively on
the quantitative answers of the survey, leaving the open-ended questions open for
discussion. Significant qualitative data from 32 Ejidos in 15 states was found. Four main
issues or themes were identified as recurrent and significant: Coverage, Timing and Service
Delivery, Additionality, and “Others,” which include a set of themes closely interrelated
with the program such as property rights, the middle man, environmental awareness, and
common-pool resources.
The open-ended questions were primarily answered by members of Ejidos located
in three southern states (Veracruz, Puebla and Oaxaca). It may be that the participants in
those states were more willing to share their perceptions of the program. On the other hand,
it might have been the case that the surveyors applying the questionnaire in those three
states were better trained. One way to lay out the main specific responses is to place them
in general themes, making them more manageable for analysis and conclusions, and linking
them to the theories that might be behind those perceptions.
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Coverage and Payments: One fourth of Ejidos complain about coverage and
payments. All of them conclude that the payment was insufficient to cover their
community’s economic needs. In general, no PES program in the world is expected to
provide a payment that covers family income except for the poorest families. In spite of
their disappointment concerning payment amounts,

Ejidos in Chapultepec, Galeana,

Pueblos Mancomunados de Oaxaca, Platanar del Teguino, Plan de Arroyos, and Ruiz
Cortines couched the negative answer “it is not enough” with some sort of positive
thinking, such as “it is better than nothing” or the payment “helps us to some extent.” In a
sense, these kinds of answers can be viewed as supportive of the program, implying that
Ejidos will not violate program rules even though they would like larger payments in the
future. This is probably a rare, yet real, possibility, given the contract constraints. For
example, Ruiz Cortines points out that the surface covered in the contract diminished from
one year to another, and therefore the payments for environmental services were also
reduced. Ejido Coatepec in Veracruz not only responds that the payment was insufficient
but also says that participants would tend to deviate from the program rules, namely, by
“cutting down some trees anyway.” Finally, Ejido Vidal Ruiz complains that the payments
were too little and late. This is a bad combination that could eventually impact the goals
and objectives of the program.
Timing and Service Delivery: As in several public programs, timing is always an issue.
Bureaucratic processes generate lags in service delivery. For Pro Arbol, timing is the most
frequent theme that generates discomfort among the participants in the program. According
to the analyzed survey responses, the most important finding is that the time lag is
significant, six months according to Plan de Arroyo Ejido response. This is long enough to
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compromise the environmental goals of the program, especially for Ejidos whose contract
or scheme includes in-kind payments, such as trees for reforestation. In these cases,
responses to the surveys show that there were occasions when trees that had to be planted
were not delivered on time. According to Chiteje de la Cruz testimonial, by the time the
trees were delivered, the rainy season was over and they had less opportunity to grow and
some of them dried out.
Financial management to compensate late payments is not always possible. The big
problem with late payments is manifested in low-income Ejidos whose waiting window is
very short. Ejido La Lapara claims, “Sometimes we can’t afford to wait. We could be using
the forest in a more productive way while the resources come.” If they have a loan to
compensate late program payments, these Ejidos may deviate from the conservation
practices that the program promotes either in the first year of participation or in subsequent
years of the contract because of the debt burden that they face. The surveys don’t show
income data that could be matched with perceptions towards the program. Nonetheless, it is
known that 80 percent of the participating Ejidos are poor.
Additionality: The Ejidos’ responses to open-ended survey questions give interesting
findings regarding the theoretical concept of additionality. With only eight responses that
deal with additionality, three main categories of additionality in practice were identified.
No Additionality with gratitude: Ejidos like Xmaben and Campeche state that they
would conserve their forest even without participating in the program. These cases clearly
reflect a lack of additionality of the program and should be avoided from an optimal target
population perspective. However, the same responses are also complemented with positive
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thoughts such as: “It is better to have some extra money from the government.” This may
be interpreted in different ways. It could be that they see the payment as a reward for their
conservation practices, which may further incentivize their efforts or influence nearby
neighbors to do the same and be “rewarded” in the future as a demonstration effect. This
thinking might be too positive, and, in reality, payments that generate no additionality may
disincentive neighbor communities to participate in the program –or even conserve their
forests- since they identify no real difference in community behavior inside or outside the
program. The latter interpretation might be synthesized by Guadalupe Bustamante’s
testimonial –rejected. She felt bad to have been rejected. She spends a lot of time on
conservation activities and thought she would be rewarded by the program
Partial additionality: Responses from three Ejidos reflect partial additionality.
Some communities in Oaxaca state that if they had not participated in the program, they
“would practice some conservation but probably not at the same level.” Furthermore, they
claim that by participating in the program now they are committed to maintain preservation
practices for a longer time in the future, something that was not certain in the absence of
payments.
Pure additionality: Finally, we have testimonials of pure additionality, like this
comment from San Baltazar Atlimeyaya, Puebla: “If we hadn’t we been eligible for the
program, we would have done traditional foresting and crop growing along the pastures.”
These communities represent the highest social and environmental benefits of the program.
On the other hand, some responses from communities that weren’t eligible for the program
were analyzed, and they reflect potential additionality. For example, Ejido Yeni Navan says
that they would have liked to conserve the forest to improve the environment, water, and
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biodiversity if they had been eligible to participate in the program. A key issue of program
redesign is to identify these cases and encourage them to maintain conservation efforts even
without current eligibility by providing a credible possibility for the future.
Other issues: Common-Pool Resources, Remoteness, The Middle Man and
Environmental Awareness: Several responses refer to a property rights dilemma that stems
from the Ejido’s mixture of common held land with individualized parcels. Basically, some
Ejido members complain that the benefits of the program are not equally distributed among
community members. The rules of the program favor Ejido common land over individual
parcels, thus generating some conflict between participants who think that they should
receive a higher payment because they have more individual land and those who are
considered equal with less Ejido common land. In short, is up to every Ejido to define their
specific redistribution rules for the PES that they receive from the government. Failure to
accomplish an agreed-upon distribution among participants may lead to slippage and
shirking. It is interesting that respondents always blame government for these “unfair”
distributions. They say that payments are too low, when in reality the distribution makes
the payments seem low. This happened to individual members of the Ejido in Emiliano
Zapata, Veracruz, who say that they only received three pesos per hectare.
Environmental Education/awareness: Although responses are scattered, there appears
to be a good level of environmental awareness reinforced by the program. Respondents
pointed out different issues that reflect environmental awareness, such as the notions that
conservation generates benefits for everybody, that the program enabled them to work on
shaded crops to some extent and that this kind of program is good for future generations,
and that fire incidence has decreased since the program was launched. Remoteness: Some
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Ejidos in Campeche and Puebla are somewhat skeptical of the measurements of their
forested surface and hence argue that they are receiving a smaller payment than they
deserve. They claim that their land is located in remote areas without roads, and they do not
fully trust satellite images.
Finally, there are opinions regarding the role of the middleman of the program, more
properly known as the technician or advisor of the program. In San Bernardino, Puebla,
ejidatarios claim that the forest conservation process was going well with the help of
government advisors, who verified and monitored the land that was subject to conservation.
These ejidatarios received valuable feedback from middlemen as a byproduct of the
program. However, there are other cases, like the one in Plan de Arroyos, Veracruz, where
a lack of transparency or corruption is an issue since they had to pay the technician from
their own pocket.
Ejido Dynamics under a PES Context.
Most of the survey responses regarding PES are positive. However, given the fact that
the surveyed Ejidos are beneficiaries of the program and see it as an additional income
benefit that wouldn’t be available otherwise, these answers might be biased. Despite this
potential bias, specific findings show interesting differences between beneficiaries of the
program.
Another bias comes from an Ejido´s governance structure. As some of the answers
show, survey responses were given either by the Ejido’s commissar -comisario ejidal- or its
mayor. There’s not enough information about how perceptions about the program spread
through the community or the Ejido. The governmental structure of an Ejido is theoretically
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suitable for democratic participation. However, it is also prone to patronage and lack of
democratic mechanisms. In Ixtlahuacan de Reyes, Veracruz, the interviewee was the
treasurer of the Ejido, yet he never received money for participating in the program. He
said that the Ejido President managed all the issues.
Ejidos that participate in the program but shirk –by cutting down trees, developing
agricultural, or not developing conservation practices- discount the fact that next period
they will not have any participation in the program and their income will come mainly from
forestry exploitation. We don’t know how sustainable their forest practices are. However,
given the program rules, if they were eligible then it must be the case that their land lies on
the 300 most overexploited aquifers of the country.
There are three hypotheses proposed to explain why Ejidos may shirk from
following the rules of the program: 1) the Ejido just participates in the program in a year
when timber prices or outputs are low, strategically waiting for a better year in terms of
economic revenues; 2) The Ejido participates in the program and cuts down trees in a way
that doesn’t become noticeable enough to lose the payment (or they attribute the surface
change to other causes e.g., fire); and 3) The Ejido may collude with supervisors to pretend
that they are conserving when in reality they are not.
One can also distinguish the perceptions that different Ejido communities have
regarding their participation in the program and how they respond to the payments that they
receive. Some Ejidos seem to be very grateful for the payment, despite realizing that it is
low. Other Ejido responses reflect some anger or resentment towards the program. The
latter behavior is consistent with the theoretical “crowding out” concept, which basically
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deals with the issue of a community’s natural resource mismanagement that results from
state intervention through public programs.
In cases where Ejidos receive cash transfers, responses reflect some obvious discomfort
with the program. However, the responses also show that, in some cases, Ejidos are able to
somehow manage the late payments by putting in money from their own pocket. This
situation may generate several problems that may be framed as hypotheses. First, the
motivation of Ejidos to conserve and participate in the program may eventually diminish
significantly. Second, late payments may generate a bad reputation for the program itself,
which may also discourage participation from other Ejidos, especially the poorest, that were
either rejected in the past or who are eligible to participate but have not participated so far.
Third, richer Ejidos are more capable of managing difficult financial situations as a
consequence of late payments, thereby discouraging successful participation of lower
income communities. Medium income-level Ejidos still participate in the program despite
timing issues, and perhaps they would have practiced conservation even without
participating in the program. Ideally, PES programs would target populations which, to put
it simply, would conserve with the program and wouldn’t conserve in the absence of the
program. The difference is then attributed as a program impact. In practice though, finding
a perfectly targeted population is a real challenge. In sum, I conclude that additionality is a
complex issue that depends not only on the structural variables of the Ejido but also on the
preferences, behavioral perspectives from the set of individuals (Ejidos) that receive the
potential benefit. In the next chapter I will explore the evolution of PSAH, considering
available data on all variables.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE MEXICAN PAYMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES PROGRAM
In this chapter I will analyze the Mexican Payment for Environmental Service
Program. First, in order to contextualize the Mexican PES program, empirical findings in
Latin America’s PES programs and schemes are examined. Second, I provide a general
background about the Mexican PES program. Finally, a research agenda is presented for
program redesign based on the drawbacks and strengths of the Mexican PES program.
Payment for Environmental Services programs and schemes in developing world
contexts such as Latin America have been attractive in the last 20 years both for policy
makers and researchers. The appeal of these programs lies in the fact that PES schemes are
a combination of two theoretical concepts in neoclassical economics, namely, the Coase
Theorem and the Pigouvian subsidies. PES has also been considered a market-based,
sophisticated new paradigm for solving the problem of ecosystem degradation by offering
several advantages in terms of cost-effectiveness, simpler institutional design as compared
with command and control policies and even as a tool for simultaneous poverty reduction, a
permanent policy concern in Latin America (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; Wunder & Albán,
2008). There is a need for a framework that encompasses the main conditions that a given
PES scheme might face given its particular context, particularly under developing world
conditions such as PSAH. These constraints are faced both at the design and the
implementation stage of the program. Following Wunder et al. (2007), there are at least five
main characteristics that any payment for environmental service scheme should have in
order to be workable, feasible and practical at the policy stage. These characteristics are
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taken from the literature review in Chapter 1 and listed in column 1 of table 4-1. These
characteristics include: a voluntary transaction, a well-defined environmental service to be
provided, bought by at least one environmental service user, sold by at least one
environmental service provider, and conditionality (Wunder, 2005). By reviewing these
characteristics, I propose that at least one assumption of the Coase theorem is linked with at
least one of the five criteria proposed by Wunder et al. In the last row of the matrix, I add
the concept of additionality as a desirable outcome for a PES scheme. If additionality is
fulfilled, the other five previous conditions must hold. It is important to note that even if
additionality –effectiveness- of the program is not achieved, there could still be a valid PES
scheme that complies with the other five characteristics. In this sense, additionality is not
the only criterion to evaluate a PES program overall, although it is the term that is used to
specify an impact evaluation with baseline data1. Finally, it is undeniable that there are
market, government and communitarian failures associated with each of Wunder principles
and with a Coase theorem attribute as well. Hence, the third column of the matrix specifies
which kinds of failures are associated directly or indirectly with each PES principle.

1

Other forms to measure effectiveness are, for example, cost-benefit and cost-effective analysis.
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Wunder et al., 5 main
characteristics of a PES
Scheme plus additional
features
1. Voluntary
Transaction

Coase Theorem
assumptions that might be
associated with a given
PES scheme
Enforcement and rule of
law if one economic agent
deviates.

2. Well-defined
environmental
services

Well-Defined Property
Rights

3. “Bought” by at least
one environmental
service user.

No Wealth Effects

4. “Sold” by at least one
environmental service
provider.

Low or Zero Transaction
Costs
Distribution doesn´t
matters.
Complete Information
No arbitrage

Market, government or
communitarian failure for the
Mexican case.
Willingness-to-participate is
inhibited by sociodemographic
and institutional factors
(Kosoy, 2008).
Poverty and Property Rights
inhibit participation on the
program.
Uncertainty about the causal
relationships around the
environmental service (Engel et
al, 2008). (For PSAH the
interphase between forests and
watersheds)
Incomplete Contracts and
Asymmetrical Information.
Principal-Agent problems
Middle Man
Targeting Failures
Program Service Delivery

Parties are price-takers

Collective Action Issues
associated with Common Pool
Resources at Ejido
beneficiaries.

5. Conditionality

Enforcement and rule of
law if one economic agent
deviates.

Moral Hazard, Monitoring,
Free-riding, enforcement and
motivational crowding out.

Additionality

Distributional Issues at
Local Markets.

Market and Spatial Leakages
and Slippage.

Bargaining Platforms in
CPR contexts

Additional Goals i.e. Poverty
Alleviation vs. Environmental
Service Provision.

Table 4-1. Characteristics, Assumptions and Failures that might be associated with
Payment for Hydrological Environmental Services (PSAH).
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Payment for Environmental Services in Latin America
There are a number of reasons why the the majority of cases in the PES literature
for developing world contexts are depicted in Latin America. First, it the Latin America is
pioneered by Costa Rica, which is the largest laboratory for PES programs and schemes
implementation in the last 20 years in any developing world context. Secondly, the region
includes large government-based programs such as Mexico´s PSAH. Third, many
government-based PES schemes in Latin America offer similar institutional contexts that in
many cases eventually lead to common outcomes especially in terms of spillovers and
leakages and are likewise driven by underlying conditions, i.e. poverty levels of the
targeted population and ill-defined property rights of potential beneficiaries. Finally, the
region has been a robust laboratory to start “PES-like” schemes which include hybrid
experiences that combine government and user-based schemes in Bolivia, Ecuador, Central
America and Mexico. One of the main factors that has attracted attention from the
international scholar community towards the region is its great environmental service
potential reflected in its forest coverage and biodiversity “hotspots”, many of which are
endangered and therefore attract global attention through PES and PES-like programs.to
tackle environmental problems and foster conservation practices and interventions.
Especially important in this context are carbon sequestration PES schemes and Reduction
of Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) initiatives, which are mainly
funded by international organizations, firms and governments to offset carbon emissions
and globally mitigate climate change (CNF, 2011).
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Other important findings that can be drawn from the PES case study literature in
Latin America are that environmental services projects attract, on average, four times more
funding than traditional biodiversity projects such as natural protected areas, although, in
some contexts, a significant number of PES projects are located very close or even coexist
inside natural protected areas. Second, government-financed PES have caused modest or no
reversal of deforestation (Goldman et al., 2008). Pfaff, found this evidence for Costa Rica
(Pfaff et al., 2008); while Shapiro et al estimated only a net 12% reversal deforestation rate
for Mexico (Garcia et al; 2012). On the other hand, case studies of user-financed, smallerscale PES schemes claim more substantial impacts. Additionally, clear baseline data is very
important for future success of any PES program. Evidence suggests that only a few
countries in Latin America have sound baseline data in order to make appropriate
comparisons based on monitoring, reporting and verification systems that also account for
social capital indicators. Baseline is crucial to determine the impacts of any PES program.
However, for government-based programs such as PSAH, baseline data has been difficult
to gather due to implementation failures of the program and lack of sound monitoring,
verification and report (MRV) systems (CNF, 2014).
A major issue in the region regarding PES is the role that side goals play in PES
program design. Not only has poverty alleviation been proposed as the key side goal for
PES programs, but also other side goals such as land tenure and local economic
development. Other than local case study experiences that have shown that the PES
government-based program served as an incentive for poor communities in southern
Chiapas to improve their property rights situation (Kosoy & Brown, 2014), the main
finding here is that, despite the importance of side goals, no broad evidence exists about

51

environmental service effectiveness in addressing those side goals in addressing those side
goals?
Despite these findings, institutional heterogeneity between and within countries have
made comparisons between Latin American countries very difficult to establish.
Insufficient data and the impossibility to control for institutional differences have made
comparative quantitative models difficult to develop (Pattanayak et al., 2010). Still, some
patterns emerge to explain the performance of PES programs in this region. Institutional
environmental and economic preconditions of potential program beneficiaries face similar
challenges across Latin America. These challenges include land tenure and property rights
definition, lack of sound participatory arenas, and the implications of common pool
resources for government-based schemes management.
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Case

Costa Rica
PSA (Pfaff
et al, 2008)

México
PSAH
(Muñoz
Piña, 2008)

Mexico.
Lacandon
Forrest
(Kosoy et.
Al. 2008).

BuyersProviders
Voluntary
Transaction
FONAFIFO
(Autonomous
State
Agency)/
Private
Landholders,
Indigenous
Community.
Federal
Government
as main
buyer; Three
Public
Agencies
interact
directly with
the Program.
Federal and
Local
Governments
Frame.

Targeted
Resource

Conditionality

Spillovers &
Leakages

Additionality

Side-Goals

Water,
Biodiversity,
Carbon
Sequestration
and
Agroforestry
Projects.

High and
subject to
future
payments.

It is
complemented
with
Command and
Control
policies.

Little Effect:
Approximately
2% (Pfaff et.
Al.)

Poverty
Alleviation

Strategic
threatened
watersheds

High

Rent seeking
by
Communities
with Timber
Firms.

Explicit
Baseline for
the Program.
However,
divergent
results from
different
evaluations.

Poverty
Alleviation, from 2007ongoing)
Natural
Protected
Areas
(NPA´s)

Biodiversity
and Carbon
Fixation

Not
Determined.

Increase in
Land-Tenure
Security.

Not
determined.

Poverty
Alleviation
(The
Evaluation
focused on
one of the
poorest
regions of the
Country).

Implicit Future
Scenario

Complements
weakly
enforced
forest rights.

Neighbor
NonParticipants
feel Excluded

Participatory
Rules have
an upper
income bias.

Pinampiro,
Ecuador
(Wunder,
Engel and
Pagiola,
2008)
Profafor,
Ecuador

Los
Negros,
Bolivia
(Turiansky,
2010)

NGO´s and
external
donors buy
services of
local
villagers
User-Based
scheme.
FACE, a
Dutch
Consortium,
pays forest
villagers.
Fundacion
Natura
(NGO)

Collective
Action Issues
at the Ejido
level.
Unmetered
water Users
tend to FreeRide

Watershed
Protection

High in the
first years but
declining

Carbon
sequestration
through
reforestation

Additional
Funding after
third year,
subject to 80%
reforestation
rate.

Climate
Change
Mitigation
Offset
beneficiaries

“High”

No

Watershed
and
Biodiversity
Protection

Untested

Low

“High”

Complements
Weak Rules
on
Deforestation.

Table 4-2. Latin American most Relevant PES schemes in the last 10 years in terms of
Scale and Scope.
Adapted from various sources: Pattanayak 2010, Wunder et al. & Cabrera and Kosoy
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Table 4-2 summarizes the most fundamental PES cases that have been put in place
and evaluated over the last 15 years in Latin America in terms of scale and scope according
to the international literature. It includes the main features of a PES scheme and follows the
same approach discussed in Table 1 by emphasizing actual failures in terms of leakages and
spillovers as well as the additionality impact that has been identified throughout the
implementation of each program in its own particular context. These environmental
services findings are either based on case study evaluations of PES in the region, or
developed through rigorous econometric quasi-experimental analyses that include baseline
and control group data,
Three types of schemes are identified with regards to their buyer-seller
composition: i) market-based schemes were either financed by non-governmental
organizations and/or international donors, who buy environmental services directly as in
Los Negros, Bolivia and Pinampiro, Ecuador; or a private firm that buys the environmental
service as in the PROFAFOR program ii) the government as the only or main buyer of the
environmental service, namely, the Mexican Pro-Arbol program and all its derivatives,
including, of course, PSAH and iii) the Costa Rican case using quasi-governmental or
government-like scheme types (Pfaff, 2008). In this case, a semi-autonomous public agency
or a public-private partnership funded by a mixture of public, private, and international
resources is the main buyers of the environmental services. On the other hand, the providers
of the environmental services are mainly local communities, some of them indigenous with
their own rules of use.
Each of the most renowned cases in Latin American are integral as they try to
encompass the four most important environmental services: carbon sequestration,
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biodiversity, agroforestry and hydrological services. While government-based and
government-like cases such as the Costa Rican and Mexican experiences encompass the
four main environmental services through different components, the NGO and privatebased PES schemes are much more specific and focus on only one kind of environmental
service at a time.
A remarkable result of program evaluations that have been carried out in Latin
America, as Table 1 shows, is that all of them provide a “high” or “very high” level of
conditionality as defined by a contract in which both parties agree to preserve the
environmental services. Compliance with this provision is verified by monitoring,
verification and compliance mechanisms which are also agreed upon between both parties,
typically satellite images. However, in terms of additionality –the most difficult goal to
achieve- significant differences might be found between the low levels of public-based
programs in Costa Rica and Mexico compared with high levels that have been
demonstrated in small-scale firm and NGO-based programs in Ecuador and Bolivia
(Turiansky, 2010). Ex ante, this fact does not imply that user-based, small-scale schemes
are superior as a general rule. Given the large scope and scale of government-based
schemes, it might be the case that under the government-based scheme umbrella, there are
particular projects that will eventually become PES user-based or REDD+ projects at the
local levels, and then have relatively higher effectiveness results. However, right now they
depend on government for a transition process. In this sense, current projects that are
beneficiaries of the program will eventually be transformed into actual environmental
service markets with a user-based approach fashion and with an undefined time horizon
(Alix-García et al; 2010; Pattanayak, 2010). Clearly, not all selected projects will
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automatically be transformed in user-based ES markets after five years of public
intervention2. Still, the additionality levels for public programs are low, but positive, and
they can increase in the next years if proper adjustments are made to the targeting criteria.
All scheme types inevitably present some sort of spillover and leakages that are
different in kind from the environmental service provision itself. In fact, user-based small
schemes are not absent from leakages. For instance, in in Los Negros, Bolivia there is some
evidence of negative effects of PES implementation such as job loss, competition for land
and social tension between those receiving payments and those who do not (Grieg-Gran,
et al; 2005).
Overall, any environmental service scheme either government or user-based needs
to be constantly recalibrated and adjusted for actual and potential leakages. In the Mexican
case, the main leakage sources that have been identified are: i) a set of targeting failures in
the changing criteria selection throughout the recent history of the PSAH and ii) the low
level of environmental market creation after public intervention through five year PES
programs. As for the Costa Rican government-based program, it is very interesting that
FONAFIFO has been calibrated and adapted to the country´s international tradition and
worldwide leadership on the management of one of the main command and control
instruments in forest policy: Natural Protected Areas. FONAFIFO is actually vastly
implemented in a Natural Protected Area geography and basically, the program has
accounted for the fact that, in principle, additionality is not achieved when a PES program
is embedded inside a Natural Protected Area (FONAFIFO, 2012). Therefore, when
monitoring, enforcement, and weak property rights exist, a PES scheme might provide
2

The main reason why this is very unlikely to happen is because there are targeting failures in the aim to achieve the “optimal” targeted
population of the program. Therefore, projects that provide low, very low or null additionality levels during the project are also those
with relatively lower incentives to attract potential private and NGO buyers and create a market.
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some additionality to the community in which it is implemented, even in an NPA. In this
sense, it is not an either/or policy design, but a hybridization process between a command
and control, and a market based instrument.
Unfortunately, thus far positive spillovers in the form of substantial “demonstration
effects” for neighbor communities with similar characteristics haven´t been clearly
documented in any case. On the contrary, there´s some evidence of “negative
demonstration effects” in the Lacandon Forest in Chiapas, Mexico, where non-beneficiary
neighbors have expressed their discomfort at being unfairly excluded, and perceive that the
selection process hasn´t been equal for all participants (Kosoy et al; 2008).
Finally, poverty alleviation seems to be the primary complementary goal for
governments that run PES programs in Latin America. For the user-based schemes in South
America, no income variables have been measured before and after the intervention of
private and international funding that consider the opportunity cost of enrolling their land in
the scheme. Another poverty correlated variable in which small-scale schemes have
focused regarding side-goals has been in complementing weakly enforced forest rights or
weak rules on deforestation. In short, there are three main issues that need to be addressed
regarding the implementation of PES schemes in Latin America: the environmental
behavioral change of former beneficiaries of PES programs; the feasibility of user-based
PES schemes with government co-management; and the role of side goals on PES
programs. The Mexican experience offers a sound laboratory in which to explore these
three issues.
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Payment for Environmental Services in Mexico Background
During the 2003-2012 period, roughly 5,800 forest communities participated in a
Payment for Environmental Service program in Mexico. This participation encompassed
3.2 million hectares and the average annual payment per hectare averaged between $36 and
$47 USD (CNF, 2011). All in all, the PES set of programs in Mexico is the highest-scale
program in countries with high deforestation rates. In 2012, 16.2 percent of PSAH projects
were approved, which equals 27 percent of the feasible allocated land. Adjusted to projects
that effectively cover all the program requisites, the success rate is a little higher (25.5
percent). About half of the selected projects (47 percent) are located in selected
municipalities (UNAM, 2012)3.
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Figure 4-1. Mexico´s Annual Deforestation Rate in the International Context: Selected
Countries
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization. Forest Resources Assessment 2010
3

A list of priority municipalities has been issued by the National Forestry Commission (CNF) based on human development and poverty
indicators as well as forest coverage variables.
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The evaluation literature (Rossi, 2007) suggests that any public intervention, usually
through a public program, should have a causal theory. Therefore, in essence, a public
program may be defined as “a discrete and exogenous intervention (Xt1) about a public
issue (Yt1) that seeks to alter the status quo in the desired direction” (Maldonado, 2013).
The public issue at stake is that Mexico simultaneously has a high degree of deforestation
and aquifer overexploitation around its territory, issues that call for public intervention.
Figure 3-1 shows Mexico´s deforestation rate for the period 2005-2010. According
to FAO, and compared with other Latin American countries, a negative 0.05 annual
deforestation rate is not as bad as countries like Brazil, Argentina or Guatemala. However,
given the country´s size in absolute terms, Mexico´s acreage of forested land is the second
highest in Latin America and it is in the top 10 around the world (FAO, 2012).
As mentioned in Chapter 1, in Mexico, 70 percent of forests are held in common
property in the form of Ejidos or indigenous communities. Three thousand communities
develop some kind of productive forestry activity. One-fifth of those communities have
been formally constituted as a forest enterprise. Five million people who live in Mexican
forests are indigenous. Overall, the Mexican PES experience has focused on four different
environmental services: hydrological environmental services that include capture,
infiltration, and provision of enough water quantity and quality in selected areas;
biodiversity conservation; climate change effect mitigation through capture sequestration
and storage; and soil retention through agroforestry techniques, formation and scenic
beauty.
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As part of a global strategy to foster PES in Mexico, the federal government through
Comisión Nacional Forestal National Forestry Commission (CNF, 2011) set out two
initiatives. In 2003 the Program of Hydrological Environmental Services (PSAH) was
initiated, and in 2004, the program to develop an environmental market for carbon
sequestration and biodiversity derivatives and also to forge the establishment and
improvement of Agroforestry Systems (PSA-CABSA). These last two programs merged in
2006 in a single comprehensive program known as Pro-Arbol. Budgetary allocation has
increased steadily to these kinds of programs. For example, in 2007, the federal budget
increased five-fold with respect to the previous year (CNF, op cit.).Funding for PES
programs has been volatile mainly due to the nature of its sources. A national Forestry
Fund was established in 2003 in order to avoid political and budget cycle uncertainties and
to have a multiannual and long-term perspective in order to guarantee funding for five-year
long contracts.
Overall, during the 2003-2011 period, roughly 5800 forested communities have
participated in a PES program. 600 million dollars were allocated for PES programs in
Mexico within the same period. This amount translated into 5000 projects that were
executed through an extension of 3,113, 000 hectares. Currently, the environmental service
concept of Pro Arbol is broken up in two subprograms: hydrological environmental
services and biodiversity conservation. Both programs are based on opportunity cost
compensation to local forested land holders and were created with the main objective of
maintaining certain ecosystem conditions that favor different environmental service
generation. A contract between the land holder and CNF is signed. Land holders commit
themselves to maintaining forest coverage or to carrying out best management practices in

60

order to conserve the natural ecosystems that interact around the forested land. CNF pays a
fixed compensation per hectare during five years. Program participants agree not to change
land use and are encouraged, but not forced, to carry out surveillance activities under the
enrolled pieces of land in order to avoid poaching, fires, and other negative activities within
the forest. Monitoring activities are done by the National Forest Commission (CNF), which
determines payment continuity. Technically, PSAH offers some elements of a Conditional
Cash Transfer (CCT) program since monitoring and verification activities through forest
coverage satellite images at the macro level are overseen by the government annually to
authorize the next year´s payment. Inside the participant communities at the micro level,
activities and labor to improve forest condition are encouraged, but not required.
Evolution of Payment for Environmental Services Programs in Mexico
Mexico´s PES program consists of a set of subprograms according to different
environmental services including hydrological Payment for Environmental Services Pago
por Servicios Ambientales Hidrológicos, which PSAH designed for watershed protection
and launched in 2002; Pro-Arbol, a subprogram for biodiversity conservation also launched
in 2002; and PSA-CABSA, originally launched in 2002 but redesigned in 2007 (Muñoz et
al; 2008). Although these three subprograms have clear linkages between them. For this
research, I will focus on PSAH Pago por Servicios Hidrológicos.
PSAH offers direct cash transfers to land owners of Ejidos or privately held
property. The cash transfers depend on the amount of land that the owner has. Land that is
subject to participation is mostly forest that is located throughout the 300 hundred most
exploited aquifers in the country (Edgar et al; 2012). The scheme payments try to
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compensate land owners for conserving the forest, limiting farming, livestock or timber
activities.
Five-year contracts that are subject to yearly renewal or adjustment are granted by
the Mexican government to land owners. Verification and monitoring is carried out through
satellite images. Less than 10% of former beneficiaries are granted a second-term contract
thereby neglecting the long term horizon that some authors claim is needed to achieve
additionality (Pattanayak, 2010). Sometimes, unusual changes in the forested area are
found. As analyzed in Chapter Two, land owners usually claim external causes for these
changes–weather, inaccurate measurement devices, encroachment, etc. Despite these
difficulties, satellite images have proved to be a cost-effective deforestation monitoring
policy.
Figure 4-2 shows the historical distribution of the program´s enrollment; Oaxaca,
Chiapas, Michoacán, and Chihuahua are the four leading states participating in the
program. There are 10 states that have very little or no participation in the program. Coastal
forests are the most frequent type of ecosystem to be incorporated in to the program,
followed by cloud forests and template forest bosque mesófilo de montaña to a lesser extent
(García et al, 2012).
Still today, a significant percentage of projects with high willingness-to-participate
–and with a high degree of additionality potential- are excluded from program participation.
According to 2010 data from CNF, for every ten potentially eligible program participants,
less than three were actually selected for a PES scheme. The other seven were excluded
primarily due to budgetary reasons or, to a lesser extent, because of incomplete or
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inaccurate project proposals. No data exists about the potential target population ignorant of
or disinterested in the program, perhaps due to high poverty, isolation and marginalization.
It is commonly known that the potentially excluded participants are amongst the poorer
households. A challenge for the program is to persuade rejected participants that they have
a real chance to become eligible in future years and thus, they should continue to preserve
the forest.

Figure 4-2. Rejected applicants from the Payment for Hydrological Services Program
(PSAH) with data from National Forestry Commission (CNF).
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Figure 4-3. Recipient-Rejected Comparison by State 2010. Source: Author`s
elaboration with data from CNF.

Recipient and rejection patterns have also been very asymmetrical between states
for the PSAH program. Interviews with policy makers and program executers explain these
asymmetric patterns as a result of significant difference in terms of capacities, human
capital, technological platforms and skills within state and municipal offices around the
country.
Payment for Hydrological Services: Evaluability and Main Outcomes
In order to make valid conclusions about a public intervention/program a venue of
the public policy literature claims that a public program should have at least 10 years of
implementation (Sabatier, 1999). Sabatier´s conclusion is a general rule and it is mainly
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focused on a developed world context. For the Mexican PSAH, this theoretical prerequisite
was satisfied in 2013 not only in terms of time span, but also in terms of information
availability beginning from the design stage in 2000. Rossi (2007) argues that the
evaluability of a program crucially depends on the causal theory that is embedded or
articulated either implicitly or formally in the program´s rationale (Rossi, op. cit.). PSAH
formally assumes that there is a clear and unequivocal causality between forest coverage
and water recovery4.
At the practical level, PSAH has been evaluated from different perspectives drawing
different preliminary conclusions. In this section I will highlight the main insights that have
been drawn from PSAH design and implementation evaluation in the last years. As in the
Latin American trend, most of the evaluations that have been carried out in the last years
for PSAH have been impact evaluations based on GIS regressions that seek to tease out and
control for all other confounding variables and estimate the net impact of the program given
a robust enough pair of datasets that match program beneficiaries with a rejected pool of
voluntary participants with similar characteristics. Ultimately, this kind of analysis looks
for significant differences between both groups (Khandker, 2010). In a nutshell, advantages
of Propensity Score Matching (PSM) methods rely on the fact that it enables one to obtain
statistically significant differences between groups if “only observed characteristics are
believed to affect program participation” (Khandker, op. cit.). On the other hand, possible
drawbacks of these kinds of evaluations are the lack of quality data that a) guarantees
conditional independence, that is, that unobserved factors do not affect participation and b)
4

During the design stage of PSAH from 2000-2003, there was a thorough discussion about the plausibility of the forest-water
interphase between national and international interdisciplinary groups. At the end, the conclusion was that, in general, most eligible
ecosystem for program participation in Mexico reflect aquifer restoration as a dependent variable of forest coverage See Muñoz &
Guevara (2003). After 10+ years of PSAH implementation, no proposals have been made by stakeholders at the technical level to
reform this basic causal relationship.
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attainment of a sizable common support or overlap in propensity scores across the
participant and non-participant samples. Additionally, tests have been created in order to
elicit institutional preconditions that determine willingness-to-participate on the program
(Kosoy & Brown, 2008).
Finally, Mexico´s National Evaluation Council (CONEVAL) has developed process
and performance evaluations from the program by. This third set of evaluations mainly
focuses on the process and implementation phases of the program, seeking articulation
between inputs, outcomes, and results in a Logical Framework and Monitoring and
Evaluation (M&E) trend that has also taken place in Mexico during the last decade (OCDE,
2013).
Altogether, impact and qualitative evaluations, along with process-based and
performance M & E exercises in the last year for PSAH provide a battery of useful insights
regarding the nature, evolution, and future policy perspectives of the program. In the next
section, I will summarize these insights in order to clarify them and determine which lead
to improved public policy decision making in terms of program continuity, termination or
adaptive adjustment and specifically which PSAH components are still in need of further
research.
Impact Evaluation Results
Different studies show different results. All of them specify that the program has
had positive effects, but there is no agreement on the measurement and scale of these
positive effects. The reasons for this inconclusiveness are an inaccurate baseline and
different methodologies. Evidence for the Mexican government-based program also
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suggests that there are a number of leakages that might lower the final impacts of the
program (Shapiro, et al; 2010).
First evaluations of Mexico’s PSAH Pago por Servicios Hidrológicos program
suggested that its impacts have been positive but small (Shapiro, E., 2010). More recently,
impact evaluations of the program have shown relatively higher impacts of about 30%
deforestation reduction (Alix-García et al; 2012). Two issues emerge in analyzing this
indicator. First, leakages of the program should be subtracted from the general impact.
Second, there is no objective international benchmark to define how good a 30%
deforestation rate is, given the variety and uniqueness of Mexican forested ecosystems. In
any case, though, the two main lessons are i) that the effectiveness of the program has
enhanced significantly in the last three years of operation of the program and ii) that there’s
still ample room for further improvements of the intervention.
The results show that Mexico's program has had a small positive impact in terms of
preventing deforestation. The impact is highly heterogeneous by property type and region.
Additionally, Alix-Garcia et al. (2012) find evidence of some deforestation spillovers to
other lands, specifically within communal properties in remote regions. “Between 2003 and
2009, approximately 2.27 million hectares of land were entered into Mexico's PES
programs, making it one of the largest in the world” (CNF, 2011). These findings were
determined by analyzing the 2004 beneficiary’s cohort. During the 2004-2006 period,
PSAH went through an adaptive phase in terms of targeting criteria (Muñoz et al; 2008).
Rules of operation modified criteria in order to include higher deforestation zones,
marginalized and poorer zones. In order to improve the targeted population of the program,
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significant changes took place during 2007. More recent evaluations that consider 2007
cohorts show larger positive effects of the PSAH program.
In principle, impact measurement efforts of PSAH establish a coefficient of 30% of
less deforestation. However, after controlling for leakages and slippage, estimate show a
lower 12 percent net impact of PSAH (Alix-Garcia et al; 2012). Unfortunately, there is no
international benchmark to compare these results. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the
determinants and dynamics that dissipate the impacts of the program and that are reflected
in high levels of leakages and slippage. The main explanatory determinants that have been
explored are rent seeking groups that capture a significant percentage of program benefits,
and targeting failures based on a pool that could be enhanced not only in the selection
process criterion, but also in actually improving recruitment and generating a higher quality
pool of potential beneficiaries.
The land, credit, and labor market rigidities that prevail in the Mexican rural context
might be sources of spillovers and leakages of the Mexican PSAH program. This is
particularly true when land is held in common in the form of Ejidos. The mechanisms in
which spillovers and leakages can take place are through prices, wealth effects and
substitution. Ostrom (2012) identifies two types of leakages regarding public interventions
that try to reduce GHG such as PES and REDD+, especially in a developing world context.
One is the leakage between locations where any project could be shifted from location X to
location Y due to a PES, REDD+ or climate change related project in X so that no net
reduction in X is produced. The second is a market leakage that is produced due to a price
increase due to reduced supply which leads to increased production of timber due to market
distortions. Some evaluations of the PSAH program have tried to control for these leakages.
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Although they are difficult to measure, the net result is a positive impact of the program is
that is more than 10 percent of land that would have been deforested in the absence of the
program, even in the presence of leakages.

Non-Impact-Based Evaluations
Non-impact and results-based evaluations have also shown some crucial findings
for the program. Critics of these evaluations claim that they do not measure for
deforestation, use counterfactuals, or account for potential spillover effects. In short,
“environmental benefits could be substantially reduced if environmental damages are
simply displaced to other locations”. Despite these limitations, anecdotal, descriptive,
qualitative and outcome-based evaluations show interesting insights into the program
dynamics and effectiveness.
The National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) recently carried out a
survey as part of a comprehensive evaluation based on program beneficiaries perceptions
(UNAM, 2012). Results of this work show that, in general, program recipients do not
consider oxygen and water as ecosystem services that are provided by the natural resource.
Rather, they consider them only as local benefits without a watershed or global perspective.
They are not familiar with the main objectives and instruments of the program and, finally,
they consider the program only a direct subsidy in exchange for preventing deforestation
for a limited period of time, and in some cases in exchange for some recommended
activities by forest technicians. From an economic perspective, surveyed beneficiaries are
not aware of the potential for creating a market with other direct users in the absence of the
subsidy. From an ecological perspective, there is a lack of awareness of the regional and
global implications of their forests.
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Final use of financial resources is not conditional, although certainly encouraged, on
conservation activities by program beneficiaries, since PSAH is an outcome-based and not
an action-based program. Even so, and according to UNAM´s survey, a majority of PSAH
beneficiaries reported to have spent or invested the subsidy in conservation activities. In
contrast, some of the projects that are located in the most marginalized zones but with high
levels of social organization have invested the subsidy amount in the provision of public
goods such as local health centers, transport and local trusts for health and death insurance.
In sum, the main conclusion of this evaluation is that, based on the perceptions of
beneficiaries, future continuity of PSAH in the long-run is compromised by a lack of basic
knowledge about the program objectives, ecosystem services, and awareness of the
potential for market creation. Therefore, after contract termination, ex-beneficiaries most
likely will switch their land use into short term profit activities such as agriculture and
livestock.
Finally, regarding process-based evaluations of the program, coverage of PSAH has
consistently increased each year during the program´s life span. However, as pointed out by
impact evaluations, one cannot infer that increasing forest coverage has led to the ultimate
goal of the program (CONEVAL, 2013). Even so, monitoring conclusions of PSAH carried
out by the National Evaluation Council (CONEVAL) show that, in terms of service
delivery, PSAH performance is observed to be generally effective. Outcome and process
goals and indicators of PSAH have been reached and even surpassed, with the exception of
the plant survival component, whose lower achievement is attributed to “operative issues in
reforestation activities, that might be hindering its effectiveness”5 (CONEVAL, op cit.). As
5

The other set of forest programs that are included in the same Results and Indicator Matrix (MIR) of PSAH are: Forest Research
Projects’, Forest Certification, Commerce Forest Plantations, Best Management Practices for Forest Cultivation, soil and reforestation
and biodiversity.
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a preliminary conclusion, the institute affirms that significant transaction cost scenarios for
PSAH are disregarded for running the program. This is important since it sets the path to
clarify the main findings of PSAH either at the design stage or at the ex post impact stage
which we will focus on for the remainder of this work.
Finally, based on m the two principal components of the most recent Logical
Framework in 2013 namely, i) incorporated surface for payment for hydrological and
biodiversity services and ii) durability of incorporated surface for PES programs in Mexico,
one can conclude that PSAH has been operationally effective. A federal government
surplus combined with earned interest on the Mexican Forest Fund allowed for the
incorporation of 19 percent more land to the program than was projected at the beginning
of 2012. These positive trends led to 387,471 hectares being enrolled for the PSAH for that
fiscal year (CONEVAL, op. cit.).
The second main component relies on the permanency of the surface that was
incorporated to the program in the previous three years within the 2008-2011 period. Of the
originally enrolled PSAH projects continue to be in place, 98.5% percent are complying
with the conditions of the program, mainly based on vegetation coverage. The original goal
was 95 percent. These results show that, operationally speaking, PSAH is an efficient
public program and there are no significant bottlenecks or bureaucratically failures that
hinder program procedures. Once projects are approved, there is no evidence of significant
drop-outs either at the beginning or in the middle of the contract. In conclusion, both
indicators are very positive conditions for program effectiveness. However, these
conditions are necessary yet insufficient conditions for the achievement of additionality.
Even in the logical framework context, the ultimate “Goal” indicator states that the program
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seeks to “contribute to maintain the environmental goods and services in the country,
through incorporation of forest surfaces to sustainable forest development schemes” (CNF,
2013).
Mexican Environmental Policy and Institutional Background for PSAH
Implementation: First, Second and Third Generation Reforms

It is crucial to briefly analyze recent institutional evolution in Mexico in order to
better understand the design of PSAH, where it has been implemented, and also to get a
better sense of the limitations and potentialities of the program. At the micro level, the
Ejido context was covered in Chapter 3. In this section, I examine the context of PSAH at
the Mexican environmental policy macro level.
Although PSAH is a market-based instrument, its development, performance, and
implementation take place under command and control and in a context of imperfect
institutions. Likewise, the Mexican environmental policy transition has changed from a
government-based to a new environmental governance approach, also known in the
literature as community-based environmental management approach (CBEM). These
institutional trends have derived into cross-cutting policies and a set of environmental
programs such as PSAH, whose evolution has not been sequential or linear. On the
contrary, nowadays it is possible to observe the overlapping and coexistence of three
simultaneous kinds of environmental policy: command and control, market, and
community-based, which will be interchangeably called in this chapter first, second, and
third generation reforms, respectively.
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Changes in institutional arrangements in the form of laws and operation rules have
been put in place in order to introduce innovative environmental policy instruments as well.
There have been different levels of success at the design and implementation phase of these
kinds of programs, particularly for Payment for Environmental services and REDD+
Reduction of Emissions for Deforestation and Degradation policies.
The first generation command and control approach and, more recently, second
generation market-based approaches have been the cornerstones that have been discussed
by scholars and followed by policy makers. These approaches have been applied to
different contexts that involve deforestation both in developed and developing world
contexts. In the last decade though, a new set of alternative approaches have been proposed
for hydrological environmental services and adopted in countries like Mexico. As
mentioned earlier, frameworks like the new environmental governance and the communitybased environmental management appeared as a response to both the global climate change
adaptation and mitigation coordinated policies from international agencies, grassroots and
non-governmental organizations, companies and governments to develop CO2 emissions
offset schemes.
Both the environmental governance and CBEM paradigms are still works under
construction and sometimes lack a mainstream methodology. They are referred to by
different terms across the literature: environmental governance (Speth, 2006); (Hempel,
1996), environmental conflict resolution and consensual approaches (Maguire, 2003),
common pool resource management (Ostrom, 1990), community-based and grassroots
(Lubell, 2004), stakeholder analysis and sustainable ethics approaches (Harremoes, 2002),
among others. Often, these approaches pursue the same goals as command and control and
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market-based

approaches,

namely,

hydrological

services

provision,

biodiversity

conservation and carbon sequestration by preventing deforestation.
Although command and control and market based approaches continue to interact
on most natural resources realms, including water and deforestation, there are some
segments where neither command and control nor market based approaches provide an
optimal solution that seeks for additionality and is consensually adopted by and embedded
within local communitarian dynamics. This is the case for PES and PES-like programs in
the rural Mexico Ejido context. Therefore, I suggest that a twofold perspective should
always be taken in order to better understand the results of the PSAH program within the
Mexican context. The first perspective takes into account market schemes and market and
government failures in order to understand efficiency and additionality issues. The second
adopts general communitarian and cognitive views and “bottom up” policies that are
adopted, interpreted and implemented by communities.
Under some environmental settings in Mexico, neither regulatory nor market-based
approaches have been enough to countervail overuse, depletion or overconsumption of
environmental services. As a consequence, non- mainstream or alternative approaches have
been proposed to fulfill this vacuum. It is important to note that these approaches are
neither mutually exclusive, nor sequential. Rather, they can be blended in an optimal mix of
processes that enable their coexistence. For this, it would be necessary to set up the
platforms, rules, and arenas that provide the opportunities for “top-down” and “bottom-up”
approaches. In this sense, given the centralized nature of PSAH, it only offers a
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standardized set of rules for participation in the program that are not flexible enough to
account for local, context-based dynamics6.
Innovative Environmental Policy Instruments
Over the last 30 years, Mexico´s environmental policy has departed from traditional
command and control toward market-based environmental policy instruments. First
generation environmental policy instruments are referred to as norms, standards and
government-based environmental policy regulation. These kinds of instruments have been
extensively studied throughout the second half of the 21st century at the international level.
For the Mexican case, forest management and natural protected areas policies took shape
during the eighties and nineties. At a more recent stage, second generation reforms rely on
basic market-based fundamentals that aim to allocate resources efficiently at the
environmental sector where incomplete markets or market failures are abundant.
Historically, the context in which Mexican Payment for Environmental Services
programs emerged occurred exactly in the middle of the transition of first and second
generation reforms. In Mexico, like in many other Latin American countries, one can
distinguish between first and second generation reforms. First generation reforms pertain to
the command and control realm mainly focused on top-down policies and regulatory
policies. In contrast, second generation reforms have been traditionally associated with
market mechanisms, deregulation, or decentralization. The main goal of these set of
policies is to incentivize economic agents to attain some plausible outcomes through more

6

However, in the last three years, a decentralized “branch” of PSAH has been developed as a pilot project called Fondos Concurrentes
which stands for PES concurrent funds in which basically, federal government provides only part of the PES payment amount, while the
environmental service-user (could be a municipality, a state, or an NGO could provide the other part of the subsidy). Under this scheme,
local rules have a better chance to be included in the form of Best Management Practices. The current state of affairs of the Fondos
Concurrentes initiatives as well as the Best Management Practices implications will be thoroughly analyzed in the next chapter.
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active participatory mechanisms of policy subsystem stakeholders for the creation or
modification of new institutional rules of the game (Samaniego, 2002).
Traditional market approaches involve green taxes and subsidies. In practice, one of
the main challenges of these instruments is to accurately define the tax/subsidy amount that
addresses the missing or incorrect market price that might be distorted by the presence of
an externality (Keohane & Olmstead 2007; Tietenberg, 2000)7. PSAH is a kind of green
subsidy-based program that requires a clear payment vehicle linked with and funded from
environmental service users. In order to address this issue in the Mexican PES program, a
fiscal instrument was created in 2003 and called Fondo Forestal Mexicano (Mexican Forest
Trust). Under this instrument, a higher fee is charged on households which are along the
300 most overexploited aquifers. Revenues from the additional fee are earmarked to Fondo
Forestal Mexicano to fund PSAH and guarantee and give credibility to the conditionality of
payments for hydrological services for five- year contracts. However, this payment vehicle
process is still “diffuse” given the fact that all revenues in all geographical revenues are
directed to the same “box”, limiting the visibility and direct interaction between
environmental service users and providers. Again, this scale constraint is being partially
addressed by encouraging PES schemes at the subnational and local level through the
Fondos Concurrentes subprogram8. Until now, these local experiences with clear payment
vehicles have had different levels of success and have not been systematized or deeply
researched. In sum, Mexican PES programs, including PSAH, have struggled both in

7

During the targeting discussion in next chapter, I will analyze the challenges, difficulties and implications in trying to establish the
adequate subsidy amount.
8
Fondos Concurrentes stands for multiple stakeholder funding cooperation that potentially includes a mixture of resources from
federal, state and municipal levels of government as well as NGO´s and private firms that function as environmental users. In a way,
Fondos Concurrentes program works as a Section II of the traditional government-based PES program. Fondos Concurrentes ultimate
goal is to set up the conditions for market creation and user based local schemes that will eventually work without government
intervention.
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defining the “optimal” amount for the payment or subsidy of the environmental service, and
also in creating local markets with clear payment vehicles between the environmental
provider and user.
Closely intertwined with second generation reforms are the public management
instruments and organizations that are required to set out innovative policies. For the
Mexican case, several public agencies are responsible of running the program The National
Forest Commission (CNF) is the main agency responsible for the design and program
implementation. National Water Commission (CONAGUA) is also involved in identifying
the most overexploited aquifers around the country and collecting water right fees that are
earmarked for the program. In this sense, at the beginning of the 21st century, the
Environmental and Natural Resources Secretariat (SEMARNAT) agency was created. Two
very important agencies were also soon created to accompany Semarnat´s work; one was
the National Institute of Ecology, and the other was the National Forestry Comission
(CNF). These two decentralized agencies designed and carried out the negotiation process
to create the first PES schemes in Mexico, which came to be the single most important set
of government-based PES programs in Latin America. Complementary, the National
Commission for Biodiversity (CONABIO) was created. This new institutional supply
paved the way for PES and second generation environmental policy reforms across the
country (Figueroa, 2012). The interaction of these agencies after 14 years of their creation
has been “policy fragmentation”. Table 4 illustrates the evolution of environmental policy
instruments in Mexico, highlighting PSAH as an emblematic example of this transition
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Environmental
Policy
Instruments
and Reforms

Instruments

Issues

Challenges

Stakeholders

Stage/Phase
of
Implementation
in Latin America
and Mexico

Command and
Control

Laws, Decrees,
Acts,
Norms
and Standards.

Overregulation

Flexible
enough
regulatory
frameworks

Government

Maturity.
Still
play a structural
role
for
environmental
policy

Market-Based
traditional
instruments

Cost-Benefit.
Willingness-topay

Information
Asymmetries

Government
and other
economic
agents

-Second
Generation-

Willingness to
Accept

Optimality level
definition with
empirical data

Neoclassical
economics.

Taxes and
Subsidies

Adolescent stage.
Mixed
and
inconclusive
results regarding
the creation of
real
markets
where
market
failures previously
existed

Cap & Trade,
Pigouvian Taxes
and Subsidies,
Coase Theorem

Green
Incentives for
Renewable
Energies,
Environmental
Compliance,
Certifications
and EcoLabeling

Institutional
Preconditions
to match
neoclassical
assumptions.
i.e. welldefined
property
rights and
low
transaction
costs for
Coasian
efficient
outcomes.

–First
Generation-

“Third
Generation
Instruments”

Payment for
Environmental
Services

Collective
Action Issues.

Environmenta
l Justice
Institutional
Design

Reduction of
Emissions for
Deforestation
and
Degradation.
REDD+

“The polluter pays
principle”
Property Rights
Definition in land
markets

Stated
Preference
and revealed
preference
ecosystem
valuation
limitations

Environmental
Impact
Evaluation
Market-Based
Instruments
embedded in a
context of New
Environmental
Governance

A clear supplier
and demander
of
the
environmental
service
that
wants to be
preserved

Actual examples for
the Mexican Payment
for
Environmental
Services battery of
programs.
Natural
Protected
Areas, Norms with
reference prices for
land use changes
according to different
ecosystems
Pollution Charges for
pollutees.

Crowding Out
Cooperation
Market,
Government and
Community
Failures

Government,
Economic
Agents
and
Communities
under
intervention

Infant stage.
Urgency
to
identify success
stories and scale
them up within
regions
with
sound monitoring
and
verifiable
outcomes

PSAH,
REDD+;
Wildlife Management
Units
(UMA´s);
Voluntary
Natural
Protected Areas at the
Communitarian
Levels; Public-Private
Partnerships

Strategic
environmental
Evaluation

Table 4-3. Environmental Policy Instruments in Mexico: First, Second and third
Generation as applied to PSAH in Mexico.
Source: Author Elaboration based on OCDE, 2013. Mexico´s Environmental
Performance Evaluation. Presented at University of Guadalajara. February, 2013
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The Complex Interphase between Second and Third Generation Environmental
Policy Reforms in Mexico

As stated in Table 4, PSAH implementation cross-cuts the second and third
generation instruments while not totally escaping first generation regulatory policies. On
the one hand, neoclassical economics principles were put in place at the design stage of the
PSAH program and still continue to be fine-tuned and adjusted in order to improve its
performance. On the other hand, different stakeholders, groups, and policymakers have
pushed to maintain the vision, scope, and criteria of PSAH embedded with first generation
instruments by giving more relative weight to command and control instruments such as
natural protected areas at the selection stage9.
However, second generation reforms applied to PES programs such as PSAH go
beyond the mainstream environmental economic Pigouvian taxes and subsidies. As
discussed in the literature review of Chapter 1, the Coasian approach also has a lot to say
about the design and implementation of PES schemes in Latin America and Mexico, in
particular with our study object: The Payment for Hydrological Services Program (PSAH).
Despite having, in principle, Pigouvian elements ex ante, the design of the PSAH program
opens up the possibility –and in fact encourages- the development of Coasian arrangements
any time from receiving the first payment until contract termination at the end of the five
year pre-established period.
Originally, the perspective of creating markets as a consequence of PES public
intervention came from program designers and international funders (Shapiro, 2012).
However, due to implementation and targeting failures in the first years of the program, as
9

Both visions will be examined in the next chapter of the dissertation through interviews with policy-makers.
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well as the Mexican government’s contention that PES programs in Mexico should have
dual environmental service and poverty alleviation components, weakened the original
market-based philosophy.
Based on a Washington Consensus perspective and according to neoclassical theory,
the ultimate goal behind the construction of PES programs in Latin America and Mexico
was to create green markets that overcome suboptimal results that are typically associated
with PES contexts in Latin America and Mexico. From a political economy perspective,
and in an effort to apply a Coase Theorem perspective, market equilibrium might be
reached if crucial assumptions are achieved, (mainly, low transaction costs and well defined
property rights), there are no significant wealth effects, complete information between the
bargainers exists and, finally, that consumers and producers are price-takers10.
One basic prerequisite for Ejidos to participate in PSAH is verification that they are
legal holders of the land that will be used to offer the hydrological environmental service.
In general, this basic precondition was instituted for the Mexican PSAH program,
especially after the second generation reform that took place in 1992 that allows Ejidos to
lease, rent and sell their land.11

As in most government-based programs, demand to

participate in PSAH has always surpassed the budgetary supply of the program. Hence, by
definition, all selected participants have complied with the well-defined property rights
requirement. At the national level, and regardless of the PSAH program, there are still some
issues for the appropriate definition of property rights in rural Mexico. In particular, it is
difficult to distinguish between de jure and de facto property rights claimed by different

11

Previously to this reform, it was impossible to make any market transaction and hence no Coasian bargaining could take place.
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Ejidos and indigenous communities in the same places, and encroachment and low levels of
rule of law that lead to property trespassing are still predominant in some geographical
regions of the country. From a PSAH perspective, there is not enough information to
establish if the environmental quality of the project candidate pool would provide more
additionality from potential beneficiaries that still lack well-defined property rights
definitions, and hence can´t be selected by the program.
Overall, only a very small fraction of PSAH selected projects have ended up in the
creation of new environmental markets. Why is this percentage so low? According to
Shapiro (2012), the original goals of PSAH in terms of creating new markets was very
high, especially among program designers from the World Bank that accompanied the
configuration of the program, as well as from policy-makers from the national Ecology
Institute (INECC), who were mostly economists.
Arguably, one of the main hypotheses about the low level of market creation relies
on the declining targeting efficiency of the program that, according to some evaluations,
has prevailed in the last years of the program. This issue is the subject of a thorough
analysis in the following chapter (Shapiro-Garza, 2013). In any case, having a very low
“market creation coefficient” for the PSAH program in the last 10 years does not
necessarily imply that the great bulk of approved projects in the last year did not provide
any additionality at all to the program and are then just a resource transfer. In Chapter 2, the
Ejido analysis showed that partial additionality might be achieved if pro-conservation
behavioral changes on the part of the population were attained as a consequence of program
intervention. These kinds of behavioral changes are mainly referred to in the literature as
“pro conservation” or non-economic motivations that may drive or hinder willingness to
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participate, comply or learn from the program during its participation, and are determinants
for future environmental behavior in the absence of the program (Turiansky, 2010).
Towards Third Generation Reforms
Third generation reforms refer to the moment when market-oriented policies and
programs in the environmental realm need to be complemented by

institutional,

communitarian, and environmental governance variables in order to achieve the original
goals towards efficiency. Otherwise, the program in the environmental realm, in this case
PSAH, would “crowd out” local communitarian structures and hence the outcomes of the
program itself would be jeopardized (Cárdenas, 2000). The set of “rules of the game” of
local communities that are intervened by a market-based process is often called
environmental governance12. In the specialized literature Lemos & Agrawal (2006) define
environmental governance (EG) as the set of “interventions aiming at changes in
environmental-related incentives, knowledge, institutions, decision-making, and behaviors”
as well as “the set of regulatory processes , mechanisms and organizations through which
political actors influence environmental actions and outcomes” (Lemos & Agrawal; 2006).
In this sense, the main issue in the governance concept definition is that government is only
one more actor, maybe but not necessarily the main actor, among other sets of stakeholders
that include communities, businesses and NGO´s. EG is typically greatly influenced by
international and national market-driven policies such as Payment for Environmental
Services (PES) and Reduction of Emissions for Deforestation and Degradation (Agrawal,
2010). Cooperation within an environmental governance context for market-driven
initiatives such as PSAH is crucial in two ways. First, since PSAH and other PES-like
12

Although a complete explanation of the environmental governance literature is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is important
to note that an environmental governance structure is a necessary condition towards the success of any PES or PES-like intervention.
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initiatives are, at least to some extent, a conditional cash transfer (CCT) and an outcomebased program, they require appraisal by program participants in order to renew the
subsidy. Second, in the long term, after five-year PSAH contract termination, those projects
that strengthened their own local rules through cooperation and alignment with the
program´s external rules will have a much higher probability of endurance and
environmental service provision even in the absence of the Pigouvian subsidy and even
without market creation. Thus, it is the interplay between environmental governance
structures before and during program intervention, along with market-based criteria
provided by PSAH incentives that determine future outcomes and results of the program in
terms of additionality.
In the case of PSAH, the basic outcome that is taken into account to measure
program success through the history of the program has been forest coverage 13. Forest
coverage does not reflect the additionality level since we don´t know if forest coverage
would have taken place anyway in the absence of the program. Nor does it reflect the
environmental governance dynamics that underlie the effort to maintain the forest coverage.
According to six in-depth interviews in 2012, program beneficiaries, have carried out
communitarian conservation activities much more intensively because of their participation
in the program.14 The interviews also showed that there are “failure cases” where those
same conservation activities would have taken place even in the absence of the program.

13

In order to reduce the transaction costs of the program, it was decided that outcome verification would be done by satellite images and
not by direct visit to selected lands, except in extreme cases where direct visits are required due to some preliminary issues identified at
the satellite images stage.
14

Five in-depth interviews were carried out in December 2012 in the municipality of Talpa de Allende, Jalisco, Mexico. This municipality
ranks among the top ten locations where Payment for Environmental Services projects have been directed in the last 10 years. It is
home of the most threatened and biodiverse watershed of the country. The insights of these beneficiaries will be discussed later on the
concurrent trust section of this chapter.
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One source of the problem lies in the general nature of the verification variable of
forest coverage for PSAH. More comprehensive PES or PES-like programs for carbon
sequestration such as REDD+ require more sophisticated indicators at the Ejido-level in
order to achieve contract compliance. As mentioned, PSAH is basically based on forest
coverage results. The payment is based on yearly outcomes in terms of forest density
conservation. Actions to keep the forest are encouraged but not enforced and the contracts
are based on results. This design feature has policy consequences.
Results-based schemes may make additionality more difficult to identify and
positive results could be achieved even in the absence of sustainable actions. However, and
according to program designers, if conditionality were attached to action-based schemes,
conservation results would be more difficult to monitor (Munoz et al; 2008). The Mexican
PSAH scheme is a results-based scheme with a highly significant component of outreach
from CNF. The opportunity cost of labor on high risk forests is also high. This is the main
argument for PSAH to be results-based and not action-based. Another possible argument
was the high monitoring costs of actions.15
PES and REDD+ programs in Mexico have been inserted into the international
mitigation and adaptation climate change agenda. Specifically, Mexican PES programs
have been pooled under the agriculture and forestry set of policy interventions for low
carbon development around the country. It is important to note that the forestry sector

15

A way to bridge potential tradeoffs between outcome vs action-based processes has been to implement a requirement for PSAH
participants under the Concurrent Fund modality. Participants need to develop a “Best Management Practices” plan at the end of the year
of participation on the program.
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where PSAH is included is considered to be one of the main engines to reduce carbon
emissions in Mexico16.
Conceived as a single sector, agriculture and forestry provide the highest primary
emissions potential (32%), followed by transport (27%), power (17%) and energy
efficiency (16%). Payment for Environmental Services is one out of twelve interventions
within the agricultural and forest sector that account for the highest global emission
reduction potential in Mexico for the next 35 years17. Therefore, PSAH evaluation is not
only a matter of public budget efficient resource allocation in present time, but also
demonstrates the need and advantage of having a solid PES program that stands as a
cornerstone of cost-effective policy options for Mexico in decades to come within the
international climate change context. Under this scenario, in 2010, the World Bank
published a strategy report titled Low Carbon Development for Mexico (Johnson et al;
2010). This World Bank document called MEDEC (a Spanish acronym that stands for
Mexico: A Study about Carbon Emissions Reduction) provides key insights into the steps that
need to be followed in order to significantly reduce Carbon Emissions in Mexico for the
next forty years. One of these steps is directly related to LULUCF interventions (land use,
land-use change, and forestry sector).

The document considers PES programs within the broader context of a
comprehensive forest sector strategy for Mexico. In fact, they consider PES Mexican

16

One of the main conclusions of the document is that: “Although energy-related emissions dominate Mexico’s current and projected
CO2e trajectories, the forestry sector provides the single greatest potential for reducing greenhouse gas emissions over the coming
decades. Forestry interventions are generally more costly than those in transport or energy efficiency (on a $/t CO2e reduced basis), but
most interventions that combine the reduction of deforestation and forest degradation benefit with the productive use of biomass,
especially for energy purposes, have net benefits”.
17
This scenario is based upon the construction of an economic and emissions model for Mexico to the year 2030, where the Business as
Usual (BAU) trend is consistent with national income, energy estimates and international energy forecasts and markets. It also includes
bottom-up analysis of GHG reduction potential to 2030 from major sectors (Johnson et. al., op. cit.)
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programs, especially PSAH, along with other LULUCF interventions as first steps towards
a comprehensive forest-sector low carbon strategy in which REDD+ is the main policy
intervention (Johnson et. al., op. cit.). After PES contract termination, some of the most
successful projects will serve as candidates for upgrading for REDD+ projects. The reasons
that PES programs in Mexico are suitable for a broader range Climate Change mitigation
and adaptation policy intervention in the form of REDD+ and other LULUCF interventions
are that the policy process as well as the targeted population overlap. Furthermore,
conditionality of PSAH established in user-provider contracts, although being a potential
market failure source, represent similar mechanisms for future climate change adaptation
initiatives (Angelsen, 2008). As a consequence of all these similarities, it is very likely that
many PES projects will eventually become REDD+ projects (Pattanayak, 2010, op. cit.). As
previously mentioned, one of the shortcomings of PSAH, according to the PES literature, is
the relative short-time span (5-years) of the contracts, which compromises additionality
attainment after contract termination. This drawback may be partially addressed if we
consider that a fraction of successful PES projects will eventually be incorporated into
climate change mitigation and adaptation initiatives.18.
Future scenarios pinpoint PES as an important intervention for low carbon
development in Mexico. Standard cost-benefit analysis draws negative net costs for the
PES intervention. Net costs for the PES intervention and its relatively low mitigation
reduction have to be carefully accounted for. While REDD+ interventions explicitly
account for economic benefits for the productive use of biomass for the production of
biomass and the substitution effect for fossil fuel inputs, positive externalities and indirect
18

The other way in which it will be addressed is through a potential behavioral change of program beneficiaries during their
participation on the program through the application of Best Management Practices (BMP´s) and/or the provision of environmental
local public goods. This other venue will be discussed later on this chapter.
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benefits of PES through forest conservation were not included in the MEDEC study
methodology19. Furthermore, the scenario assumes an extension of five million hectares for
PES, and that program effectiveness continues to be stable. However, as it will be discussed
in depth in the next chapters. There are ample opportunities for targeting, and hence
effectiveness improvement, leading to greater mitigation impacts of PES policy
intervention.
Table 5 summarizes the total costs and benefits that each forest sector related
intervention will potentially have according to baseline information. PES programs in
Mexico are projected to mitigate 4.4 tons of CO2 annually at a cost of $18.1 per mitigated
ton. Overall, this is a relatively low mitigation impact as compared to other forestry and
REDD+ initiatives for energy purposes such as biomass electricity and charcoal production.
It is relatively low even for other interventions whose goal is not the productive use of
biomass, such as wildlife management, which provides a maximum annual mitigation
reduction of 27 tons of CO2 per year.

19

Stated- Preferences and Revealed-Preference methods such as Contingent Valuation that account for use value, option value and
existence value were not included in the MEDEC estimations since the scale of the study was at the national level. Clean Development
Models (CDM´s) were also not included. Finally, transaction costs are omitted from the analysis and scenarios given their complex and
intangible nature.
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Table 4-4. Mexico´s Low Carbon Development Scenarios for Agriculture and Forestry
Interventions for 2030.
Source Johnson, Todd M. MEDEC: Low-carbon development for Mexico

Figure 4-4. Land-Use Emissions wedge graph
Source Johnson, Todd M. MEDEC: Low-Carbon development for Mexico
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CHAPTER 5
EVOLUTION OF TARGETING CRITERIA
One of the most striking failures regarding the management of public PES schemes
is lack of sound targeting mechanisms. Target rules determine justice, distribution and
access criteria for potential program participants. Ultimately, target criteria decide the
magnitude and direction of potential environmental outcomes and impacts of the program.
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the characteristics of the targeting criteria for
PSAH programs as well as the environmental policy motivations to create those criteria
during the period 2006-2012. Furthermore, this chapter examines the policy implications of
the targeting criteria that have been used in the last 7 years to allocate PSAH projects.
Finally, it also analyzes the alignment between PSAH and the international literature of
PES that was explored in Chapter 1.
Targeting Criteria Characteristics
The number of selection criteria used to identify participants in Payment for
Hydrological Services PSAH has evolved through the years. In 2006, there were nine
selection criteria for a maximum total of 45 points, which determined the terrain eligibility
(CNF, 2012). Environmental criteria represented about 40 percent of the total point scale.
In 2010, there were 26 selection criteria to reach a maximum of 106 points; this lessened
the weighting of environmental criteria to only 19 percent of total possible points,
allocating the rest to social and other secondary criteria.
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Figure 5-1 Targeting Evolution of the PSAH Program
Source: (Garcia Romero, 2012).

Evolution in the number of criteria took place in response to different forces: the
influence of international agencies on PES programs convenience both on theoretical and
applied grounds, public agenda of topics and trends that are translated into program rules of
operation within the policy process and interest groups and stakeholders with a vested
interest in adding new criteria into the program.20.Aggregate results of these interactions
motivate research questions regarding the evolution of targeting indicators for PSAH. For
example, are more targeting criteria a desirable program design goal? Do positive/negative
interactions and overlap between targeting variables exist? Is there an optimal number of
targeting criteria? What are the implications of PSAH targeting rules in terms of
participation incentives? Is there any trade-off between targeting variables? And, finally,
20

Aguilar, Mario. State of Jalisco Forest Development Trust (FIPRODEFO). Personal Interview. June, 2014.
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what is the rationale behind the different weighting that is given to each variable itself and
each category of variables? Although not all of these questions have straightforward
answers, they motivate hypotheses and are worthy of research.
Targeting Failures
“Targeting failures” come from an internal trade-off between social and
conservation goals. Throughout the program´s history, different stakeholders have shaped
the targeting structure of the program. On the one hand, some of the criteria are taken from
PES international literature in terms of environmental indicators, where the notions of
deforestation risk, ecosystem type and aquifer overexploitation have been recognized as
core indicators for hydrological environmental services and hence as selective parameters
for potential PSAH beneficiaries (Garcia Romero, 2012).
In principle, matching environmental indicators among a well-defined targeting
population should lead to higher effectiveness levels of the program. At a second stage of
the program beginning in 2008, a new type of indicators related to socio-demographic and
poverty-related variables were added to the program´s targeting criteria array. One year
later, a third set of indicators emerged. This set of selection criteria is neither environmental
nor social since they have more to do with “territorial criteria” associated with natural
protected areas and other regulatory instruments defined by the geographical scale of the
provided environmental service.
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Figure 5-2.Targeting areas for PES participant candidate projects.
Source: García Romero (2012).

Figure 5-2 shows the targeting population of PSAH. In the Y axis, high opportunity
costs are directly related with high deforestation risk, whereas the horizontal axis shows the
potential forest land that might be covered by the program given the amount of Payment for
Environmental Services (PES). Deforestation risk is determined by the opportunity cost of
land use change in the form of agriculture, livestock, real state, tourism, urban development
or timber activities. Pieces of land on the area below the demand curve and above the price
that is set by the PES compensation amount are unattainable for the program. According to
neoclassical theory, projects within this area will be transformed from natural capital to
physical capital (Solow, Robert, 1991).
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Segment two on the graph is both feasible and potentially additional to program
results. In this area below the demand curve and between Fp and F*, the difference between
the decision of conserving the forest or using land for other activities is, precisely, the price
or compensation amount set by the PES program. This is the efficient targeting population
that the program attempts to capture. Finally, projects that are located on segment 3 of the
graph do not produce additionality to the program since they would have preserved the
forest anyway, even in the absence of the program. In these cases, a wealth transfer would
be given from the program to the applicants without any additionality results.

Two

empirical questions emerge from the targeting population depicted on the graph. First, if
area two is the targeting population of the program, why would there be program
beneficiaries from area 3?21 The second question is, what is the optimal amount of PES
payment?22
At the very crux of these indicators crossover lies the international literature review
about how an ideal PES scheme should look in developing world contexts. Pagiola (2005)
raised the debate about whether PES schemes should have side goals related to poverty
alleviation (Pagiola et al; 2005). Although it is a desirable goal per se, it might hinder
program effectiveness. A set of empirical experiences in developing world contexts give
some hope to a win-win scenario when preventing environmental degradation and poverty
alleviation are met simultaneously (Castañeda Navarrete, 2012). However, these results
cannot be extrapolated to all PES scheme experiences in Latin America. Thus, for the

21

Rossi (2007) portrays major issues why targeted population is not 100% achieved within a public program context. The main reasons
for this are:
22
This is an empirical question. For PSAH, a payment list has been developed according to the four basic forest types that characterize
the Mexican ecosystem context. However, this differentiated compensation table doesn´t fully accounts for the real opportunity costs
that include other variables such as deforestation risk.
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Mexican case, the tradeoff (or synergy) between environmental service provision and
poverty alleviation requires evaluation.
Targeting Criteria Revisited: Evolution during the 2004-2011 Period
Given the accelerated growth in the bulk of indicators of the PSAH program in the
last 10 years both in quantity and nature, I propose four different categories to classify the
type of targeting criteria that has been used in order to select the projects. During this
process, I will also examine the relative weight that each indicator has been given for
project selection as well as possible interactions between different criterion and the
outcomes that come as a consequence on PSAH performance, outcomes, and goal
accomplishment. In the rest of this work, and following one of the streams from the
literature review, I examine the plausibility of targeting criteria in terms of efficiency (–
additionality) as the main public policy objective.
I identify four main categories that have shaped the program in the last 10 years.
The first category is environmental-type variables such as deforestation risk, overexploited
aquifers, water availability, forest coverage and mountain slope. The second category is
natural resource management and property rights criteria, e.g., having a forest
management plan. The third is social variables mainly related to poverty. The final
category includes a set of command and control instruments that are related to the
environmental policy context in which potential PSAH beneficiaries live such as natural
protected areas that are subject to the program.
Historically, and from a public choice perspective, different groups have put each of
the four categories on the agenda for the benefit of a particular interest. This argument
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mirrors the classical public choice argument which states that “the interests of those who
are subjected to the control instruments must be taken into account as well as the interests
of those affected by external diseconomies” (Buchanan and Tullock, 1975). Each targeting
criteria set is plausible in its own right; however, it is the interaction amongst variables that
may reduce program effectiveness
All in all, roughly 50 criteria have been included at least once throughout the history
of PSAH. Some of them have persisted and others have vanished intermittently. There are a
couple of possible explanations for why some criteria have disappeared through the
implementation years of the program. Changes may result from a negotiation process or
from new public agenda topics within the policy subsystem (Sabatier, 1999), or, it is an
issue of low demand (very few applications that fulfill the new program selection criteria
and policy-makers who decide to undo them).23 Yet another possible explanation for these
changing trends is the overlapping redundancy that new criteria imply over the criteria that
were already put in place. Economically speaking, each additional criterion adds a marginal
cost and a marginal benefit towards program effectiveness. At some point, though,
marginal costs may be higher than marginal benefits leading to suboptimal targeting
decisions or “targeting failures” (OECD, 2013).
Environmental Indicators
Environmental indicators are the raison de etre of the program. They were born
with the program and represent its main goals according to the different ecosystems around
hydrological environmental services, namely, forests, water, carbon sequestration and soil
degradation (Table 5-1). Forest coverage, deforestation risk and slope represent proxy
23

Bonilla, Sara. CNF. Personal Interview, May 2014.
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variables to estimate the environmental services that are provided by project participants.
Overall, these criteria accounted for 28 percent of the program´s relative weight. Each of
the environmental criteria provides a specific treatment to provide additionality to the
program as a whole.
Recalling Chapter 1, Wunder’s third main characteristic of PES schemes is “to
define the environmental service causal chain and therefore define the mechanism between
the environmental service provider and user” (Wunder, 2005). For the Mexican case, as for
many other cases worldwide, this relationship is inconclusive. Sound empirical evidence
that demonstrates and measures the forest cover impact on water supply is scant, complex
and requires long-term research. Despite these insufficiencies, the Mexican PES program
was designed assuming that there is a positive, though not quantifiably known relationship
between forest cover and water supply (Muñoz et al, 2008). Consequently, a first targeting
criterion was to pinpoint the most overexploited aquifers of the country. As a result, by
matching environmental service users and providers, deforestation reduction policies are
aimed to complement sustainable water supply policies.
Deforestation risk is the second most important targeting criterion. It refers to those
lands that, as means of their location, species composition, or terrain characteristics are
both environmentally rich and attractive for land use change and deforestation if economic
pressures increase (market integration, tourism, real state, etc.). Consequently, these lands
are neither suitable for commercial use and timber exploitation government programs, nor
for highly degraded forestry land recovery programs in areas where erosion prevents
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productive uses of land24. By applying forest subsidies, the intention is to increase timberbased activities thereby preserving forest-based activities and inhibiting land use changes
for agriculture and livestock activities. However, these subsidies do not reach fragile
forested lands that are not suitable for commercial timber uses because of scale, slope or
type of forest, yet are vulnerable to land-use change for agriculture and livestock by means
of deforestation.
This is the very segment that the PES program tries to address: projects that are not
eligible for timber production, yet have a relatively high opportunity cost with regards to
real estate, agriculture, livestock and tourism projects. These pieces of land are considered
to be at higher risk for deforestation since the opportunity cost is also high. Owners of this
land are often tempted by market forces to adapt their land for agriculture and/or livestock,
thereby promoting deforestation. Furthermore, timber-based producers are usually well
organized in groups and associations and arguably in a better position to take advantage of
government-based programs that induce forest activities, leaving out individual producers
with non-commercial forested lands.
Typically, the first lands to participate in the program are the ones with lower
opportunity costs since they do not really face a trade-off with regard to other economic
options, because these pieces of land do not provide additionality and effectiveness to the
program. To some extent, owners of this land would conserve the forest anyway. Therefore,
24

Actually, in 2013 a deforestation risk index was created for Mexico by the National Ecology and Climate Change Institute (INECC,
2013). “It serves as a policy instrument to pinpoint the polygons at which deforestation risk is very high, high, medium or low. the
identification of which sites have the greatest economic risk of being deforested allows an agency to direct better its resources and
support programs towards the areas of greatest need of intervention relative to cost, and obtain more conservation and sustainable use
for each peso invested. The classification in 5 levels from highest to lowest risk or pressure, a layer whose database can also be
downloaded, can provide agencies with a simple discrete variable that can be directly included in its programs’ guidelines and rules of
operation. If more precision or measurement is needed, then the continuous version of the index can be used instead”.
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the issue at stake from a program design and redesign perspective is to find a selection
mechanism that sets apart participant lands in terms of their deforestation risk and target the
program towards them.
CNF accounts forest density or coverage as a proxy measure for carbon
sequestration, infiltration, erosion and is also closely related with biodiversity conservation
(CNF, 2012). For the goals of the PSAH program, forest coverage is then a key composed
indicator that aims to target the highest quality lands, preserve them, and avoid
deforestation at higher rates.

Criteria/ Typology

Variable/ Typology
Forest Coverage
Mountain Slopes
Overexploited Aquifers
Water Availability
Deforestation Risk/
Deforestation Risk Index

ENVIRONMENTAL

Carbon Sequestration Potential
Native Forest Species
Biomass Density
Arboretum Forest Coverage
Average Watershed
Rain Forest According To
Serie Iii
Soil Degradation

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

X
X
X
X

x
X
X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

x
X

Table 5-1 Environmental Criteria for Public Policy.
Source: Author’s Elaboration with datasets from CNF, 2013.
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Some environmental indicators have prevailed throughout the years, mainly the
ones related with water availability and overexploited aquifers. Others have vanished or
were redirected to other programs such as carbon sequestration and mountain slope.
Finally, some others, such as soil degradation, have recently appeared and thus far been
maintained. As of 2011, the deforestation risk indicator was replaced by the aforementioned
index of deforestation and economic pressure, estimated by the National Ecology and
Climate Change Institute (INECC).
Command and Control Indicators
A second venue of targeting criteria is related to ecosystem boundaries, mostly in
the form of natural protected areas (NPA´s) in all their varieties. The set of ecosystem
boundaries that where included as targeting criteria opens up the same question as the
social indicators-- namely, are variables related to conservation areas a sound set of criteria
to complement and better target environmental indicators? Natural Protected Areas are a
key command and control instrument for environmental policy and conservation within
developing world contexts (Pare & Fuentes, 2007). At the theoretical level, the bottom line
between NPA´s and PES is how to include command and control mechanisms within a
market based program without compromising efficiency. As Pattanayak points out, there´s
overlap between natural protected areas and payment for environmental services
mechanisms (Pattanayak et al, 2010). Targeting criteria related to natural protected areas
included four aspects in 2007: being located in a natural protected area (Biosphere Reserve,
Federal, State, Local or Voluntary Protected Area); being at a RAMSAR site (the
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Convention on Wetlands of International Importance)-; being at the confluence of an EcoRegion, or being at a Natural Biological Corridor.
The Mexican NPA system allows for low impact economic or agricultural activity
outside the buffer zones. This characteristic potentially opened up the possibility for NPAs
project participation within the PSAH program. Another reason why PES has increased
within NPAs is the low budgetary and overseeing capacities of most Natural Protected
Areas around the country, overwhelmed by monitoring costs and unable to oversee
activities in remote areas. In this regard, PES serves as an instrument to improve selfmonitoring for communities and ejidos who live inside the natural protected area.25. From a
public finance perspective, payment for environmental services along with public spending
for natural protected areas imply a double policy intervention with potential distortionary
consequences. Assuming perfect enforcement, monitoring, community displacement or
historical compensation for original settlers at the NPAs, PES projects that are developed
under Natural Protected Areas would provide zero additionality. However, most of the
Ejidos inside NPAs haven´t been historically well compensated, are mainly poor and in
need of partial compensation or sustainable economic activities to increase their income
and prevent them from shirking on the conservation goal embedded in the natural protected
area philosophy.26.A new command and control environmental norm was also established
as a selection criterion: NOM 059 Endangered Species Habitat. Although PSAH mainly
focuses on watershed protection and hydrological environmental services, this criterion
tried to further protect the endangered species that are associated with the whole ecosystem.
25

Focus Group. Forest Stakeholders. Foro Estatal Forestal. Guadalajara, July 2014.
In short, formal boundaries of NPA´s in Mexico are often times surpassed by informal encroachment, slums and informal housing
without property rights. An emblematic example of this problem is Bosque La Primavera in Guadalajara, Jalisco, the second largest city
in the country. Urban sprawl has increased persistently and illegally in the last decade despite official efforts and boundaries to
guarantee protection at the buffer zone of the NPA.
26

100

Natural Protected Areas is the only indicator of this group that has been consistent
throughout the years. Biological Corridors has appeared more recently and the rest of the
indicators have been very volatile.
Apart from all the variables that have to do with a protected territory included in the
command and control segment (strategic restoration and degradation zones, priority
terrestrial site for conservation), two other interesting targeting criteria have been persistent
at least over two years and are currently at work, namely “Risk CENAPRED”, and “FIRCO
Watershed Program”. The former indicator has been developed by the National Center for
Disaster Prevention CENAPRED and it accounts for the areas that are subject to greater
risks as a consequence of flooding, earthquakes and other natural disasters. Data to
construct this indicator is closely related to Climate Change events and will be ever more
significant in the years to come (Piguerón, 2012). The latter indicator is linked to those
projects that are sponsored by a governmental financial agency called Fideicomiso de
Riesgo Compartido (FIRCO) Shared Risk Trust that has developed a community-based
environmental program clearly targeted in the most overexploited watersheds of the
country.
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Criteria/ Typology

Variable/ Typology

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Biodiversity NPA´S

X

X

60 Prioritary Mountains

X
X

State, Municipal or Private
NPA`s

X
X

Ecoregions

X

X

X

Hydrological/Terrestrial
Prioritary Mountains
RAMSAR Sites

X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

Biological Corridor Groups

X
Biological Corridor
Surveillance And Monitoring
Network

COMMAND AND
CONTROL
INSTRUMENTS

NOM 059. Species Diversity
Promising Area For
Environmental Services
Prioritary Terrestrial Site For
Conservation

X
X
X

Watersheds Program

X
Strategic Restauration Zones

X

X

Strategical Degradation Zones

X
Low Timber Production

X
Risk of Climate Event

X

X

GIS Polygon

X

X

Table 5-2 Command and Control Criteria for Public Policy. Source:
Own Elaboration with datasets from CNF, 2013
Source: Author Elaboration with datasets from CNF, 2013.
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Natural Resource Management Indicators
A total of 15 criteria regarding natural resource management have been put in place
throughout the evolution of PSAH (Table III).
However, this is the indicator section that has the least consistent set of targeting
criteria. The only indicator that has been upheld through time is the design of a forest
management plan. As of 2007, a sustainable forestry management plan was encouraged and
rewarded in the criteria set of targeting indicators. Since 2009, it has been mandatory for
all projects to have their own forest management plan, except for those projects that are
located inside a natural protected area.
Apart from having a forest management plan, three other kinds of subgroups of
criteria are delineated under the natural resource management category: group initiatives,
land use initiatives, and adjacent property rights relationships. In addition to the collective
organization that, by definition, underlies the Ejido projects, two indicators further
encourage collective action processes, namely, i) to be part of a group or association other
than the ejido and ii)to present an “interdisciplinary” group proposal that accounts for
socio-ecological data.
Another innovative natural resource management technique is having an agreement
with adjacent land owners in terms of the environmental service that is provided. Although
the neighbor might not be a program beneficiary, it is still very important that thereby a
Coasian agreement in cases where reciprocal externalities exist in order to minimize
program leakages or maximize positive spillovers. Additionally, being part of a zoning
initiative in order to prevent land use changes and reduce deforestation risk is rewarded.
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Having a contract with an environmental service user implies that a user-based PES
component is included within a government-based environmental service program. This
component has a value of five points for PSAH participants and has greater potential in
locations where the tourism and real-estate sectors directly receive the environmental
service which is provided upstream.
Criteria/ Typology

Variable/ Typology

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

X

Contract
Quick Answer Stimuli

X

X

Interdisciplinary Group
Proposal

X

X

Forest Management Plan
Land Use Initiatives

NATURAL
RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT,
ORGANIZATION
AND PROPERTY

X

X
X

Land Use Plans

X

Adjacent Land User
Agreement

X

Adjacent Community

X
X

X

X
X

User Contract Evidence

X

Forest Organization Member
Sound Forest Management
Stimuli

X
X

X

Adequate Compliance
Certificate

X

X

X

X

Comprehensive Forest
Development Program

X

Table 5-3. Natural Resource Management, Organization and Property
Source: Author Elaboration with datasets from CNF, 2013.
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Poverty and Marginalization

As mentioned in the literature review, a huge debate on the PES literature hinges on
the inclusion of poverty alleviation as a side goal for PSAH programs. The main question
regarding government-based schemes in developing world contexts remains: should
poverty alleviation be a side-goal of Payment for Environmental Services Programs?
Regardless of the theoretical perspective that is adopted as a framework for the program,
the main challenge is to empirically demonstrate that social indicators do not sacrifice the
environmental indicators as the main selection criteria to guarantee effectiveness of the
program. In other words, it is irrelevant if one position is favored over the other as long as
the efficiency goal is not the trade-off. On the supply side, there are a number of Mexican
social programs that have been put in place in the last 20 years in order to tackle high
poverty rates. The hallmark program regarding poverty in Mexico is called Oportunidades,
a widely-known conditional cash transfer program that has being internationally recognized
as being highly effective in

targeting its desired population. So, one of the initial

challenges for PSAH is how to avoid negative interaction with other federal programs for
poverty alleviation (Khandker, 2010).
Marginalization and indigenous communities are highly correlated variables. On the
margin, communities that are both indigenous and marginalized are preferred to
communities that are only marginalized but not indigenous. One important aspect of this
criterion and according to the available data, is that there is no distinction between different
marginalization levels or thresholds. This means that, ceteris paribus, over-marginalized
communities have the same probability to be chosen as “mildly” marginalized ones.
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Furthermore, living in a marginalized area or municipality does not imply that a particular
project necessarily comes from a marginalized household or community. In the absence of
information about income levels associated with projects located in marginalized
municipalities, it is very difficult to tease out middle and high income communities who
happen to live in a marginalized municipality.
Female participation has been encouraged consistently in the last five years of the
program in alignment with the United Nations Millennium Goals. Female participation in
environmental programs has greatly increased internationally. Another interesting indicator
in this venue is the social capital criterion. It is a methodological debate as how to
accurately measure social capital. For PSAH purposes, social capital is measured as a
socially diverse indicator that assumes that the inclusion of female and indigenous
participants strengthens the social capital of the project.
Ex ante, PSAH program designers give a relatively strong weight of 15% as a
proportion of the overall targeting to indigenous communities and the marginalization level
index.27. This fact clearly acknowledges that the Mexican program endorses the theoretical
notion supported by some scholars that poverty alleviation should be a legitimate side goal
for PES schemes.
Seven new criteria were implemented as of 2008 in order to improve targeting.
Labeled as “priority” or “special”, they showed up as “special interest municipalities” and
“priority interest zones”. One equity criterion “female solicitation”, was also introduced.
Second time applicants were also encouraged by giving them the opportunity to gain
27

The marginalization index is developed by CONAPO Consejo Nacional de Población and is based on the internationally known Human
Development Index. It is composed of poverty level, GDP per capita, Education, Life Expectancy, Childhood Mortality Rates and three
other indicators.
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additional points as well as short term stimuli. A specific preference for ejidos and
communities over private property (pequeña propiedad) was established by giving them
more points.

Criteria/ Typology

Variable/ Typology

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Municipal Marginalization
Indigenous Municipalities
Female Participation
Social Capital Criteria

SOCIAL

X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

Prioritary Attention Sedesol

X
X
X

X
X
X

X

X

Special Interest Municipalities

X

Economic Pressure Index

X

X

Community or Ejido Participant

X

X

Table 5-4. Poverty and Marginalization Indicators for PSAH
Source: Author’s Elaboration with datasets from CNF, 2013.

General Considerations regarding Targeting Criteria
Although each variable is valuable for its own sake, one key question regarding the
great number of criteria that have been described is whether there are interaction issues
among them in terms of overlap. For example, a project that has female participation,
located in a marginalized area, with indigenous participation, but has low or medium
deforestation risk will, ceteris paribus, have less additionality and impact vis a vis a high
deforestation risk project without the three mentioned characteristics. In this sense, it is
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important not only to examine the total points and quantities but, above all, their qualitative
composition and interactions with the same criteria. The same total points may lead to very
different results in terms of additionality and impact. In other words, the targeting process
might be efficient among the pool, but the pool composition that is attracted by the
inclusion of a wide variety of targeting criteria may be too broad, thereby leading to very
different additionality results. As new targeting criteria were added every year to the
program, no replacements or substitutions were made. This situation created an ever more
complex and bigger program with more variety in the opportunities for potential program
beneficiaries to compete, but also with more difficulties to ensure that environmental goals
in terms of additionality are achieved.

108

CHAPTER 6
DESIGN OF A LOCAL PAYMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
SERVICE SCHEME IN WESTERN MEXICO
Local Experiences with Payment for Environmental Services in Mexico through the
Fondos Concurrentes Program

Currently, the major trend that the PSAH program faces in Mexico is related to the
formation of user-based PES schemes within the PSAH program around the country. This
trend is important for at least two reasons. First and foremost, it bridges the gap between
demand – which connects the number of eligible projects that wait in line every year- and,
supply, which is the limited budget that is available for PSAH projects. Despite the
significant efforts that have been made through Fondo Forestal Mexicano or Mexican
Forest Trust to financially guarantee multiannual projects, ultimately, converting eligible
projects to actual projects translates into a lower deforestation rate greater deforestation
decreasing rate of 10 percent as seen in the last chapter.
Secondly, it improves targeting and efficiency and long term financial
sustainability. It is through market creation that the environmental service provider and the
environmental service user reach an equilibrium and additionality is reached. The
information process that is normally developed by government PES programs through
selection targeting criteria is now made by private individual or collective actors in a
reciprocal way such that it allows them to try to approach Pareto efficient solutions in a
decentralized way.
The aim of this chapter is to collect, analyze and systematize available data from the
35 experiences of local-based schemes called Fondos Concurrentes, which have been set
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up in the last 5 years and the Mexican Federal Government has helped only as a catalyst to
match good environmental service providers and users candidate projects. In contrast with
the national PSAH program that has been analyzed in previous chapters, CNF partially
funds projects with a less than 50 percent contribution of the whole Payment for
Environmental Service. In addition to the PES, technical assistance and a local monitor and
verification system must be put in place.28 The other half or more contribution must be
made by a subnational government (state or municipal) and/or a non-governmental
organization.
A different, more compact kind of incentive point-based system has been put in
place for Fondos Concurrentes program with a double policy goal. The first goal is to
incentivize user-based participants who are still skeptical about the advantages of these
recent schemes for the Mexican context and, secondly, to encourage and empower
environmental service providers to acknowledge their own natural capital and its proper
financial compensation. Similar to the analysis in Chapter 4, I will analyze the major
criteria for eligibility and participation within the Fondos Concurrentes Program. Finally,
conclusions and recommendations of the program will be drawn from this modality of
PSAH with a broad perspective that contrasts the traditional PSAH program of Chapter 4
with the alternative user-based rules that are presented in this chapter. Ultimately I will try
to answer questions regarding which type of scheme is better to achieve additionality. Has
the Fondos Concurrentes alternative modality been a harmonic complement of the
traditional PSAH program? From a public policy perspective, do projects that participate

28

According to the operational rules of the Fondos Concurrentes Program Technical assistance and
monitoring and verification shouldn`t be more than 8 per cent.
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under the concurrent decentralized modality face the same risks of low additionality as
projects with a traditional scheme?
Finally, a study case at a design stage will be described for illustrative purposes in
the City of Guadalajara, Mexico, the second largest city of the country at Bosque La
Primavera. Ultimately, the existence of user-based schemes seek to address the same very
issues as the federal government-based issues, namely, i) Is degradation and deforestation
evitable through participation on these kinds of schemes? ii) Is additionality and
effectiveness better achieved through user-based schemes? And iii) is it more likely that
state-level and user-based design will develop environmental markets and pro-conservation
behaviors in the long-term, after contract termination?
In terms of phases, it is important to point out that it is very difficult to shift from
federal government based PES schemes to direct user-based schemes. An intermediate
phase is Fondos Concurrentes or decentralized funds that seek partnerships between federal
government along with subnational authorities and private sector and non-governmental
organizations. The question is then, how effective will the transition process between
government-based and user-based schemes in Mexico be? According to interviews with
policy-makers in Mexico´s National Forestry Commission, Fondos Concurrentes is not a
substitute, but a complement to the federal PES program. Most of its operational rules are
similar and the diffusion process is similar in many ways.
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PES Scheme Name

State

Property Type

Bienes Comunales de San Pedro y San Felipe Chichila
Cooperativa Ambio
Sociedad de Historia Natural Niparajá A.C.
Pronatura Noroeste, A.C.
Sría. De Medio Ambiente y Aprovechamiento
Sustentable
The Nature Conservancy
Conselva, Costas y Comunidades, A. C.

Guerrero
Chiapas
BCS
BCS
Campeche

Communal
Ecological Reserve
Private
Private
Ejidos/ Natural Protected Area

Yucatán
Sinaloa

Instituto Forestal del Estado de Quintana Roo
SEDER Guerrero

Quintana Roo
Guerrero

Amigos de Calakmul
Niños y Crías A.C.
Amigos de Sian Ka an A.C.
Sendas A.C.
Ayuntamiento de Tulancingo
FIDECOAGUA
Fábricas de Agua del Centro de Sinaloa (IAP)
Fondo Monarca
Unión Internacional para la Conservación de la
Naturaleza
Los Tuxtlas Desarrollo Comunitario

Campeche
Yucatán
Quintana Roo
Veracruz
Hidalgo
Veracruz
Sinaloa
Michoacán
Chiapas

Ejidos
Communal/ Natural Protected
Area
Ejidos
Ejidos/ Indigenous
Community
Ejidos
Ejidos
Ejidos/Indigenous Community
Ejidos
Ejidos
Private
Ejidos
Ejidos/ Natural Protected Area
Ejidos

INDAYU
Geoconservación A.C.
Comisión de Agua Potable, Alcantarillado y
Saneamiento de Uruapán
Parque Ecológico Chipinque
Pronatura Noroeste, A.C.
SEDER Jalisco
Fundación Manantlán para la Biodiversidad de
Occidente A. C.
Agricultores Unidos de Poncitlán, S.A. de C.V.
Secretaría de Medio Ambiente
Grupo Ecológico Sierra Gorda I.A.P. y Bosque
Sustentable A.C.
Fondo Ambiental Regional de la Chinantla A.C.
SEDER Chihuahua
Comisión de Cuenca Alto Nazas A.C.
Protección de la Wildlife Mexicana A.C.
Fondo de Conservación El Triunfo

Oaxaca
Oaxaca
Michoacán

Comunidades/Natural
Protected Area
Ejidos
Indigenous Community
Ejidos

Nuevo León
Nuevo León
Jalisco
Colima

Private
Private
Ejidos
Ejidos

Jalisco
Aguascalientes
Querétaro

Ejido
Ejido
NPA

Oaxaca
Chihuahua
Durango
Coahuila
Chiapas

Municipality
Ejidos
Ejidos/ Private Property
Ejido
Ejidos/Indigenous
Community/ Natural Protected
Area

Veracruz

Table 6-1 Subnational Mechanisms for Payment for Environmental Services through
Fondos Concurrentes by property type of the environmental service provider.
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As shown in table 1, most of the local user-based experiences through Fondos
Concurrentes have been developed in Ejidos and communities (80 percent) and, to a lesser
extent, distributed either in private property lands or at Ejidos located in Natural Protected
Areas such as Calakmul, Monarch Butterfly Biosphere Reserve, Los Tuxtlas, El Triunfo,
Sierra Gorda y Sian Kan. These five Ejido experiences in natural protected areas provide
significant insights and findings in order to construct a local proposal for Bosque La
Primavera in the Guadalajara Metro Area.

PES Scheme Name

State

Principal

Bienes Comunales de San Pedro y San Felipe Chichila

Guerrero

Hydrological

Cooperativa Ambio

Chiapas

Carbon Sequestration

Sociedad de Historia Natural Niparajá A.C.

BCS

Hydrological

Pronatura Noroeste, A.C.

BCS

Hydrological

Sría. De Medio Ambiente y Aprov. Sustentable

Campeche

Hydrological

The Nature Conservancy

Yucatán

Hydrological /Biodiversity/
Scenic Beauty/Carbon Seques.

Conselva, Costas y Comunidades, A. C.

Sinaloa

Hydrological / Biodiv. / Scenic
Beauty / Carbon Sequestration

Instituto Forestal del Estado de Quintana Roo

Quintana Roo

Carbon Sequestration

SEDER Guerrero

Guerrero

Hydrological / Biodiversity

Amigos de Calakmul

Campeche

Biodiversity/ Carbon
Sequestration /Pollination

Niños y Crías A.C.

Yucatán

Hydrological / Biodiversity /
Scenic Beauty

Amigos de Sian Ka an A.C.

Quintana Roo

Hydrological / Biodiversity /
Scenic Beauty / Carbon
Sequestration

Sendas A.C.

Veracruz

Hydrological / Biodiversity /
Recreación/ Scenic Beauty

Ayuntamiento de Tulancingo

Hidalgo

Hydrological / Biodiversity /
Scenic Beauty / Carbon Seq.

FIDECOAGUA

Veracruz

Hydrological

Fábricas de Agua del Centro de Sinaloa (IAP)

Sinaloa

Hydrological

Fondo Monarca

Michoacán

Hydrological / Biodiversity

Unión Internacional para la Conservación

Chiapas

Hydrological / Biodiversity

Los Tuxtlas Desarrollo Comunitario

Veracruz

Hydrological

INDAYU

Oaxaca

Hydrological / Biodiversity

Geoconservación A.C.

Oaxaca

Hydrological / Biodiversity

Comisión de Agua Potable, Alcantarillado

Michoacán

Hydrological / Biodiversity /
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Scenic Beauty / Carbon Seq.
Parque Ecológico Chipinque

Nuevo León

Hydrological / Biodiversity /
Scenic Beauty / Carbon Seq.

Pronatura Noroeste, A.C.

Nuevo León

Hydrological

SEDER Jalisco

Jalisco

Hydrological / Biodiversity /
Scenic Beauty / Carbon Seq.

Fundación Manantlán para la Biodiversidad

Colima

Hydrological / Biodiversity

Agricultores Unidos de Poncitlán, S.A. de C.V.

Jalisco

Biodiversity

Secretaría de Medio Ambiente

Aguascalientes

Hydrological / Biodiversity

Grupo Ecológico Sierra Gorda

Querétaro

Biodiversity / Carbon Seq.

Fondo Ambiental Regional de la Chinantla A.C.

Oaxaca

Hydrological / Biodiversity

SEDER Chihuahua

Chihuahua

Hydrological

Comisión de Cuenca Alto Nazas A.C.

Durango

Hydrological

Protección de la Wildlife Mexicana A.C.

Coahuila

Hydrological

Fondo de Conservación El Triunfo

Chiapas

Hydrological

Table 6-2 Local Environmental Services Mechanisms Schemes classified by
environmental service type. Source: Author elaboration with data from USAID in
Saldaña (2013)

Local scheme proposals have been developed mainly through mixed projects which
include several environmental service components. In fact, 24 percent of the projects
include four different environmental services. On the one hand, this trend reflects one of the
main objectives of the program which involves incentivizing differentiated environmental
services within the same geographical area of the project. This would require four different
mini-projects, under the standardized rules of the federal PES program. On the other hand,
this feature of the user-based program presents significant challenges for sound monitoring
and verification of different environmental services within the same area.
For Bosque La Primavera Natural Protected Area, different kinds of environmental
services have been identified and are described later in this chapter. Particularly for one
Ejido called Ejido San Agustín, two environmental services are considered simultaneously:
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Hydrological and Environmental Protection. This combination is representative of 24% of
the cases at the national level as shown in table 3.

Biodiversity
Biodiversity/Carbon Sequestration/Pollination
Carbon Sequestration
Hydrological
Hydrological/ Biodiversity/ Recreation/Scenic Beauty
Hydrological/ Biodiversity Protection
Hidrológico/Biodiversidad/ Belleza Escénica/ Captura de
Carbono
Hidrológico/Biodiversidad/Belleza Escénica
Protección de la Biodiversidad/Captura de Carbono

3%
3%
6%
35%
3%
24%
21%

3%
3%
100%
Table 6-3 Type of Environmental Service Distribution. Source: CNF
Minimum
Payment
Amount per
Hectare

Maximum
Payment
Amount per
Hectare

Differentiated
Payment Yes/No

Name

State

PES
Surface
Coverage

Bienes Comunales de San
Pedro y San Felipe

Guerrero

1315

988

988

No

Cooperativa Ambio

Chiapas

7542

78

390

Yes

Sociedad de Historia
Natural Niparajá A.C.

BCS

200

470

470

No

Pronatura Noroeste, A.C.

BCS

200

470

470

No

Sría. De Medio Ambiente
y Aprov. Sustentable

Campeche

1040

327

344

Yes

The Nature Conservancy

Yucatán

3300

342

342

No

Conselva, Costas y
Comunidades, A. C.

Sinaloa

2223.85

183.13

183.13

No

Instituto Forestal del
Estado de Quintana Roo

Quintana Roo

8218.88

450

45

No

SEDER Guerrero

Guerrero

14,000

400

500

Yes

Amigos de Calakmul

Campeche

1994

604

604

No

Niños y Crías A.C.

Yucatán

3854

334

334

No
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Amigos de Sian Ka an
A.C.

Quintana Roo

410

700

700

No

Ayuntamiento de
Tulancingo

Hidalgo

215

776

776

No

FIDECOAGUA

Veracruz

1473

1100

1100

No

Fábricas de Agua del
Centro de Sinaloa (IAP)

Sinaloa

2580

692

692

No

Fondo Monarca

Michoacán

9928

684

684

No

Unión Internacional para la
Conservación

Chiapas

3011

1400

2800

Yes

Los Tuxtlas Desarrollo
Comunitario

Veracruz

2807

800

800

No

INDAYU

Oaxaca

3800

382

382

No

Geoconservación A.C.

Oaxaca

11445

1100

1381

Yes

Comisión de Agua Potable,
Alcantarillado

Michoacán

2550

764

764

No

Parque Ecológico
Chipinque

Nuevo León

1675

342

395

Yes

Pronatura Noroeste, A.C.

Nuevo León

750

382

382

No

SEDER Jalisco

Jalisco

3295

382

382

No

Fundación Manantlán

Colima

14907

400

400

No

Agricultores Unidos de
Poncitlán, S.A. de C.V.

Jalisco

200

345

345

No

Secretaría de Medio
Ambiente

Aguascalientes

3100

386

386

No

Grupo Sierra Gorda

Querétaro

14964

300

300

No

Fondo Ambiental Regional
de la Chinantla A.C.

Oaxaca

3691

495

600

Yes

SEDER Chihuahua

Chihuahua

19000

382

382

No

Cuenca Alto Nazas A.C.

Durango

8622

450

450

No

Protección de la Wildlife
Mexicana A.C.

Coahuila

479

342

342

No

Fondo de Conservación El
Triunfo

Chiapas

4451

700

700

No

Table 6-4 User-Based PES schemes in Mexico: Coverage and Payment Amounts
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Total User-Based PES schemes in Mexico

Surface

Minimum
Payment
Amount

Maximum
Payment
Amount

Total User-Based Initiatives
SUM

158,341

-

-

AVERAGE

4,657

560

615

STANDARD DEVIATION

5,037

300

479

Total User-Based Initiatives within Natural Protected Areas
SUM

48,878

-

-

AVERAGE

6,982

510

510

STANDARD DEVIATION

6222

213.83

213.83

Table 6-5 Basic Descriptive Statistics: Surface, Minimum and Maximum Payment
Amount

During the first phase of MLPSA, 160,000 thousand hectares have been supported
with an average extension of 4567 hectares per project. Nonetheless, coverage variability is
rather high, as shown in Figure 2. The minimum payment per hectare is $560 while the
maximum is $615 pesos (between 43 and 47 USD per hectare per year). For the proposal
subset entrenched under the Natural Protected Areas status, the amount is relatively lower
and accounts for $510 pesos per hectare -39 USD-. Therefore, our proposal for Bosque La
Primavera, with the pilot project of San Agustín, sets a 39USD payment per hectare. The
fact that PES amounts in Natural Protected Areas are relatively lower is probably explained
by the fact that those Ejidos are already under a command and control institutional
arrangements for conservation where public resources are invested.
In regard to the extension coverage of project proposals under user-based schemes
in natural protected areas, it is about 6,982 hectares higher than the general average that
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includes NPA and non-NPA located projects. According to policymakers of the La
Primavera NPA, this difference is explained by the existence of economies of scale due to
the large extensions of natural protected areas. It is important to remark that none of the
proposals under the natural protected areas status have proposed a differentiated payment
scheme.
An important feature that distinguishes and sets apart some MLPSA initiatives is
their monitoring and verification capabilities. During the first year of participation in the
program, Ejidos must develop a Best Management Practices Plan seeking to establish
baselines and an environmental indicator framework which eventually will reflect program
impact after contract termination. Given the experiences of the federal PES program in
Mexico as well as other similar policy experiences such as REDD+ and a Monitoring,
Report and Verification (MRV) for carbon sequestration PES experiences, evaluation
findings of these projects in Mexico conclude that the best way to create environmental
markets, additionality and pro-conservation behavior as well as sustainable environmental
management after contract termination, is through a framework that combines cutting-edge
technology with social capital dynamics. This mixed method approach is consistent with
Ostrom’s (2012) evaluation of global environmental management policies in the last 20
years which, according to the Nobel laureate, have evolved remarkably in the last 20 years
in terms of technological GIS and remote sensing-based protocols. In contrast, social and
socioeconomic dynamics at the local level have not been developed at the same pace,
widening the gap between ecological and social indicators.
Despite this recognition, building a methodologically sound system implies
intensive work and appropriation from the community, human capital, supervision and
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continuous work. Table 6 describes how only 14 percent of MLPSA initiatives in Mexico
have developed robust monitoring and verification systems that include socio-ecological
indicators. This is an opportunity area for the program to improve its effectiveness and the
probability of creating new markets after contract termination. Therefore, the PES initiative
in Bosque La Primavera will propose sound MRV mechanisms with social appropriation
and the inclusion of best management practices during the first year in order to construct
baselines.
Yet another key component for the successful implementation of these kinds of
schemes is a third party presence in the form of a facilitator. For MLPSA, this figure is
known as implementation agent. This figure is the broker between CNF and the Ejido, for
matching the financial proposal with a percentage between one and two thirds of the
money, through an incentive table that gives more value and hence a higher probability of
being selected the more the third party brings money to the table.
Successful User-Based PES Experiences at the Local Level
There are four subnational PES schemes that have received national attention for their
success, and are important to put the development of a national-based strategy in context.
These experiences are: Coatepec, Veracruz; the State of Mexico; Taxco, Guerrero and the
Monarca Butterfly Reserve.
According to Wunder et. al. (2006) there are five fundamental criteria for a PES scheme
(of any type, either user-based or government-based) in order to develop a successful PES
scheme. These criteria have been the most cited in the last 10 years in the environmental
economics literature, and they provide a useful framework to evaluate at first glance the
successful degree of a PES experience. This table has already been analyzed in the Chapter
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1 literature review. However, it is important to stress that this criteria set is equally useful
in evaluating user-based PES schemes at the local level.
Basically, both the user-based and government-based schemes provide the same
elements from Table 2.1. Two disclaimers are important: i) At least three of the five
elements are necessary to guarantee the functioning of the PES scheme ii) Complying with
at least three of the elements on the table is a necessary, but insufficient condition to
guarantee additionality of the project in the long run after contract termination due to
government and market failures associated with each element of the PES scheme.
Otherwise, the only subtle difference between both kinds of schemes is that, under the
user–based scheme the main objective is to match the “nearest neighbor” environmental
user with the “nearest neighbor” environmental service provider in order to make sure that
markets will be created and consolidated once the contract is terminated and therefore have
a greater sustainability potential. In contrast, under the government-based scheme, the user
and provider of the environmental service (the supply and demand for the environmental
service) might be diffuse, since the environmental service provider does not have direct
contact with the environmental service user. Other things being equal, this situation may
end up compromising long term sustainability once the green subsidy is removed. From the
demand curve side, identification of the environmental service by direct consumers is the
single and strongest driver for willingness to pay. From the supply curve side, awareness
from the environmental service about the real value of their natural capital is also a very
strong driver for willingness to accept payment.
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Since demand and supply curves do not follow the invisible hand principle in some sets
of the environmental realm, at least some intervention is needed in order to match both
supply and demand curves. In other words, a market should be created in order to guarantee
the environmental service payment indefinitely. This intervention may take a while since
environmental awareness from the supply side and, and environmental service
identification from the demand side may be linked with changes in preferences. The
Mexican user-based PES version basically exclusively takes care of the supply side of the
market by focusing on compensating and guiding the Ejidos with Best Management
Practices in the hope that during the five years of the contract, Ejidos should be able to
match potential environmental users with willingness-to-pay for conservation of the
forested area. In sum, market creation and the payment vehicles are the basic components
that must be taken into account in order to increase chances for additionality. The interplay
of these three factors in the implementation arena are not easy to tackle.
In Mexico, the three local experiences that have carried out a better performance in this
sense and over a relatively long time period are the municipality of Coatepec, Veracruz; the
State of Mexico; and the Monarch Butterfly Biosphere Reserve in the western state of
Michoacán, Mexico.

Coatepec, Veracruz
Five main lessons can be drawn from the local PES scheme, designed 15 years ago and
deemed to be the pioneer for subsequent PES programs in the country:
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•

In order to increase political feasibility of a water fee to fund the local PES scheme,
revenue must be earmarked from the environmental user to the environmental
provider.

•

Monitoring and verification on the field are highly expensive. Satellite images are a
fine instrument for sending credible commitment signals about the agreed upon
products and results established in the PES contracts, at a relatively low cost.

•

When there are poor selection criteria systems, the first lands offered will be those
that provide less additionality, namely, those that would not be deforested anyway
and whose opportunity cost tends to zero. Therefore, a more efficient allocation
mechanism should be put in place in order to better distribute the scarce resources
of the program.

•

From a PES design perspective, the main issue is to find those social, economic and
ecological variables such as deforestation risk that set apart the best potential pieces
of land to be chosen for participation.

•

In various eligibility zones for program participation, property rights are ill-defined
by being either unregulated or informal. This situation clearly complicates program
implementation and favors participants with well-defined property rights. The
impact of this bias could result either in a positive “demonstration effect” for other
communities to formally establish their property rights or, it could only perpetuate
and even exacerbate the bias against poorer communities.

•

Labor opportunity costs are also high in forests with high deforestation risks. This is
the main argument why PES programs (at both the federal and local level) are
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result-based and not action-based. Another argument is the high monitoring cost of
environmental labors or actions.
In essence, the trust fund combines resources from different federal and local programs
and initiatives such as Municipal Development Program (FORTAMUN), Concurrent Fund
Program (Fondos Concurrentes) and, most importantly, gets and manages revenues from a
monthly household $1 contribution.
State of Mexico
The state of Mexico is the location of the second largest state-level PES scheme in the
country. One of the main lessons drawn from it is their capability to establish a robust statelevel scheme that complements, rather than substitutes, for the federal government
program. Moreover, it establishes clear and specific allocation criteria in order to achieve a
larger PES coverage that would otherwise be unattended by the federal program
participation segment.
Two main criteria from the state of Mexico experience are worth remarking on, as
they characterize the focus of the program. Firstly, they encourage projects in natural
protected areas in ranges that are less than 300 or 500 hectares per project. A second
innovative element regarding the selection criteria is the explicit inclusion and
encouragement of participation for commercial plantation projects in four different
categories.
In addition, the PES scheme in the state of Mexico fosters conservation actions as
shown in Table 4.6 such as soil conservation, reforestation, afforestation, and natural
regeneration. Protection, biodiversity conservation, monitoring and surveillance are the four
principal components upon which the agreement is conveyed.
123

A Successful Experience within Natural Protected Areas: The Monarca Fund
PES case studies in Mexico within the natural protected areas context are very
scarce. This also holds true at the international level because conceptually speaking, while
NPA´s are command and control instruments, PES is a market-based instrument. This
incentive misalignment from using them together may lead to different policy results.
However, coexistence of both instruments is absolutely necessary at the Mexican context
since Ejidos and communities actually live inside the riparian and buffer zones of natural
protected areas. Therefore implementing a PES program within this context needs to
account for an adjusted opportunity cost of land areas. Even though forested lands inside
NPA`s are, by definition, unfeasible for market-oriented activities such as timber
production, they are still eligible for conservation activities that avoid degradation, promote
sound communitarian monitoring and, above all, provide partial compensation for local
communities. Given this paramount situation, the most complex and successful experience
of local PES within NPA´s is Fondo Monarca, which offers an excellent benchmark to
draw lessons for Bosque La Primavera.
Fondo Monarca
Environmental

partnerships

between

multi-level

governments,

grassroots

organizations, academic institutions along with Ejidos and indigenous communities have
been created in the last 15 years in the Monarca Butterfly Biosphere Reserve in order to
design and implement community-based management and development forested plans with
a multidisciplinary approach.
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During the nineties, a crowding-out effect (Cardenas, 2000) was beginning to take
place. Since the butterfly population had begun to become compromised, the 2000
conservation decree prohibited timber-based exploitation inside the reserve at the nuclear
zone, even with a forest permit. This restriction obviously wiped out traditional economic
options for local owners or Ejidos without compensation, inevitably leading to poaching
and illegal logging.
In this context, an innovative financial PES scheme was put in place in order to
support conservation activities of the forest owners and, above all, forest conservation at
the nuclear zone as biodiversity reservoirs for butterfly hibernation in Mexico: The name of
the trust fund was called: Fondo para la Conservation de la Mariposa Monarca (FM):
Monarca Butterfly Conservation Fund.
This trust fund emerged as a conservation strategy based on economic incentives
allowing a redistribution mechanism for forest conservation at the RBMM seeking to
partially compensate foregone earnings from timber-based economic activities prohibited
since November 2000. The payment was set at 18 dollars per cubic meter and 12 dollars
subject to conservation. Thirty-eight Ejidos who have property rights at the nuclear zone
have been compensated. As of 2013, through the patrimonial trust fund, a total 7.3 million
dollars have been put in place for PES compensation. Financial resources have come from
grants from World Nature Fund, Mexican Nature Conservation Fund, Hewlett Packard
Foundation, Mexican Environment and natural Resources Secretariat (SEMARNAT), and
the state governments from Michoacán and México.
Right from the beginning of the trust fund, monitoring has been carried out by
UNAM GIS experts in order to keep track of the forest coverage land use change. These
indicators are the basic input for the trust committee to decide resource allocation and
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continuity of current payments for specific Ejidos. The agreed upon threshold for annual
deforestation rate is 5% -considered stringent and high by experts. This induced significant
reductions in the deforestation rates within the Ejidos that are included in the monarch
fund.
Impact evaluations of the Monarch Butterfly Trust fund initiative provide positive
findings: deforestation and degradation have been reduced, especially that derived from
illegal logging, and the butterfly migrant population has been preserved. During the 20032005 period, 479 hectares were still partially affected by deforestation and degradation. In
2001-2012, for the first time since the reserve was decreed in 2000, no illegal logging was
registered. Still, some challenges are ahead, especially since 25 percent of the nuclear zone
is still uncovered by the trust fund.
Baselines were created in 2009 as the technical foundation for the implementation
of a PES local scheme, which although it isn´t a user-based scheme, its superlative and
global biodiversity value attracts international funding. It is important to note that contracts
have a longer term horizon than the traditional 5 year span. In fact, the aim of the financial
trust fund through sound financial management is to construct perpetuity contracts.
Monitoring at the reserve has combined both technological platforms with communitybased and social monitoring. This has allowed Ejido communities at Bosque La Primavera
to pinpoint identifiable reductions in environmental degradation by illegal logging and also
has played a role in providing information for resource allocation and conservation results
in the forested areas. Finally, a transparency and social marketing strategy has been put in
place at the local and national level in order to get further donations, even from
international sources.
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Performance evaluation of the Monarch Fund regarding conservation, restoration,
and protection of the nuclear zone confirms that a successful communitarian participation
requires improvement in credible commitments, local institutional supply for access
regulation, use and management of the common natural resource, monitoring, diffusion,
social investment and re-investment in forest activities, accountability, and strengthening of
communitarian assemblies. The monarch butterfly reserve experience and its 12 year
implementation findings and insights may be adapted to other natural protected areas in
Mexico along with PES and REDD+ initiatives, concretely by evaluating degradation costs
and measuring environmental services at the Ejido level. In sum, as of today, the Monarch
Fund has four main components that give it the opportunity to become one of the best
examples of environmental policy within natural protected areas in Mexico. The Monarch
Fund has a clear long term financial strategy that enables the construction of institutional
arrangements that facilitate local governance at the reserve, continues monitoring –both
social and technologically-based-, and ensures transparency and accountability with
payment deliverance at the communitarian assemblies.

Case Study: Bosque La Primavera Background as a Setting for a User-Based PES
Scheme
In the state of Jalisco, in western Mexico, adjacent to the state capital Guadalajara,
lies the Primavera Forest, a Natural Protected Area that covers 30,500 hectares within four
municipalities–Guadalajara, Zapopan, Tlajomulco and Arenal. This area encompasses
different kinds of forests, aquifers and streams that regulate the eco-climatic conditions of
Guadalajara´s Metropolitan area of four million, as well as other rural areas. Bosque La
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Primavera is also the natural habitat of wildlife Silvestre and is an area of great
biodiversity.
A natural protected area decree was enacted on March 6th 1980 for Bosque La
Primavera to be considered the main environmental service provider for a human
settlement of Guadalajara`s Metropolitan Area, the second largest city of the country with
an estimated population of 4.5 million inhabitants. Currently, the high population growth
rates that are registered in the former rural areas that are now becoming urban slums and
developments are the main threat for the forest. For example, in the last 5 years, Tlajomulco
has had the third greatest population growth rate in the entire country (INEGI, 2014).
Furthermore, Zapopan, another municipality of Guadalajara´s Metropolitan area, is in the
top five municipalities of the entire country on the Human Development Index Ranking.
However, income and wealth distribution is especially skewed, biased and concentrated
within this municipality, leading to the emergence of urban slums adjacent to some parts of
Bosque La Primavera and the development of high-income residential developments in
other adjacent parts of the same forests, some of them de facto violating the buffer zone
limits due to low enforcement and poorly planned land-use changes. In reality, Bosque La
Primavera exhibits all the characteristics of a public good in some areas and of an openaccess resource in others.
UNESCO went one step further and declared La Primavera as a Biosphere Reserve,
given its importance in terms of biodiversity and environmental service provision. This
problematic situation urgently calls for models and schemes that tackle the socioenvironmental disparities and trade-offs that jeopardize the Primavera Forest, leading to a
potential Tragedy of the Commons. This section explores the potential for implementation
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of a PES scheme at Bosque La Primavera under a user-based and polycentric approach at
the Ejidos of Bosque La Primavera, source of the main environmental services that are
enjoyed by the city of Guadalajara, Mexico, yet not compensated by the environmental
service providers, namely, the Ejido owners who live in the forest. Failure to bridge this
gap may lead to a Tragedy of the Commons scenario in which one of the places with
highest GDP and GDP per capita in Mexico is incapable of developing institutional
arrangements to properly compensate owners, reduce the deforestation risk, and properly
maintain the natural protected area thereby maintaining the collective good. In essence, it is
not a matter of resources insufficiency, but rather due to a collective action and free-riding
problem on the one hand, accompanied by a low enforcement-high monitoring cost issue
regarding the
management of the natural protected area as a command and control regulation instrument.

Environmental Services

Description

Hydrological Services

Overexploited Aquifer restoration, infiltration and
watershed sustainable management

Climate Regulation

Fire Management for Forested Coverage and Climate
Regulation

Biological

Fire Management and Best Management Practices to
maintain natural habitats and maintain wildlife species

Scenic Beauty

Foster low-impact activities with a strong
environmental education component

Table 6-6 Main Environmental Services provided by Bosque La Primavera

Main Threats for Environmental Services in La Primavera Forest
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Beginning in the eighties in La Primavera, land-use change for agricultural activities
and urban developments have produced negative environmental impacts within the forest
including fires, illegal logging, human settlements and slums, geothermic exploration,
electric transmission lines, and new recreation zones which have resulted in a significant
loss in forest coverage, mainly affecting the tree strata.
Decrease in forest coverage is reflected in the decline of environmental services,
soil degradation and biodiversity loss. Natural grass regeneration has been jeopardized by
private and Ejido owners who induce artificial grass growth, leading invasive species,
plagues and diseases. Natural biological corridors have also been diverted by infrastructure
projects that cut wildlife transit.

Figure 6-2 Watersheds and Biological Corridors linked to Bosque La Primavera,
Selected Ejidos. Sources: FIRCO, INEGI, and NPA Bosque la Primavera
Management Office
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Hydrological
Environmental Services

Potential Buyers

Climate regulation

Local high schools and real estate developments.
Firms located in the urban slums to La Primavera
Forest

Biological corridor and
species refuge

Local high schools and real estate developments

Aesthetic, scenic beauty and
recreation

Daily and weekend visitors

Cultural

University of Guadalajara, Private Universities, K-12
System

Table 6-7. Direct Environmental Service Users provided by Bosque La Primavera
There are several threats to the forest maintenance. In a typical year, 120 fires take
place as a result of a variety of causes. Some of them are induced by local inhabitants who
live adjacent to the forest seeking agricultural activities, others are a result of vandalism,
and small fires are generated by occasional recreational visitors. This situation is
exacerbated during the dry season. Experience shows that organic material accumulation
and the fire use frequency in the forest periphery have greatly affected the forest. A clear
example of this issue is the 2005 fire which devastated more than 12,000 hectares or the
2012 fire which devastated roughly 8,000 hectares.
Existing institutional arrangements in the area of interest for the creation of a local
user-based environmental service scheme are crucial to harness or hinder a sound local PES
scheme. As of 2013, there is a new administrative figure known as OPD which stands for
decentralized public organism. Basically, the OPD has the following objectives: i) to take
out remove administrative faculties and management of natural protected areas Bosque La
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Primavera. These responsibilities were transferred from federal to subnational governments
through a Coordination Agreement ii) To coordinate local government participation with
the state and federation level, so as the public and private entities with direct interests in
decision processes iii) To maintain the quality of environmental service provision to
inhabitants of the Guadalajara metro Area and also to foster alternative sustainable projects
for land owners, especially Ejidos. One of these projects is the development of a local PES
scheme.

Towards a local PES scheme in La Primavera Forest

This proposal seeks for a twofold differentiated approach i) the forest coverage
percentage and ii) a PES structure such that it reflects real opportunity costs in the different
polygon sections.. According to the National Agrarian Office -Registro Agrario Nacional(RAN), in 2012 there were 10 Ejidos inside the natural protected area Bosque La
Primavera. These Ejidos are: Emiliano Zapata, San Agustín, Huaxtla, La Primavera, Santa
Ana Tepetitlán, La Venta del Astillero, Tala, San Juan de Ocotán, Jocotán y El Colli.
Regarding the opportunity cost, CNF suggests a flat amount of $400 pesos per hectare
based on technical parameters. However, in the context of the Fondos Concurrentes
Program, the proposals may set a higher compensation payment. For the BLP-San Agustin
proposal a $500 peso payment per hectare was established due to the higher costs of fire
prevention, which is the main issue at stake at Bosque La Primavera. Moreover, the average
compensation payment nationwide at NPAs is exactly $500 pesos. In practice and
according to the field work at BLP, I noticed that the real opportunity cost as perceived by
the Ejido community is basically zero. They are used to a command and control mindset
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where agriculture and livestock activities are prohibited and real estate developments are a
threat that must be regulated by state authorities. In fact, one of the objectives of program
participation would be to increase awareness of opportunity costs and the compensation
they should receive as owners of the property rights of the land inside BLP.

Ejido

Hectares

Huaxtla

698

La Primavera

398

Santa Anita

552

El Colli

328

Jocotán

444

Venta del Astillero

856

San Agustín

650

Emiliano Zapata

263

Tala

1,601

San Juan de Ocotán
Total inside NPA

523
6250

Table 6-8 Ejido Forested Surface within Bosque la Primavera. Source: National
Agrarian Office, 2012

Overall, the Ejido surface inside Bosque La Primavera is 6,250 hectares. This
represents approximately one fifth of the total NPA surface which is 33, 000 hectares. Half
of the property is public and another fourth is private property. It is important to note that
one of the main issues regarding Bosque La Primavera is that there is no official data
regarding how much land is private property. However, all property inside Bosque La
Primavera either public, private or communal is subject to the BLP NPA Management Plan
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and to the National Law of Natural Protected Areas. This means that, in any case, some
activities are prohibited at the nuclear zone of the NPA, while others, such as agriculture,
are allowed only at the buffer zone of the natural protected area.
It is also important to remark that the official statistics regarding Ejido surfaces may
vary due to historical legal discrepancies, conflicts and readjustments. In particular, the
1992 reforms explained in Chapter 2 allowed Ejidos to individualize and sell or rent some
of their land to other ejidatarios who usually want to yield crops. This practice is basically a
transfer, known as deslinde, where individual ejidatarios give up send their property rights
with the consent of the Assembly. This property sold is transferred to direct family or
community members and it is not properly an open market transaction. The common land
of Ejidos is usually more difficult to transform for economic value, although often times
this land also represents the highest environmental service provision. Typical Ejidos
outside NPA's might make individual or communal transactions similar to the agricultural
parcels. However, by definition, Ejidos forested land inside an ANP such as BLP is
communal and therefore subject to all its governance and collective action issues, but
somewhat protected by the enactments of NPA's, which obviously prevent timber and other
similar exploitative practices.
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Figure 6-3 Ejidos with Forested Common Land inside Bosque La Primavera.
Bosque la Primavera Management Office.

Land use

Human Settlements
Seasonal Agriculture
Oak Forest
Oak-Pine Forest
Pine-Oak Forest
Inducted Grass
Arbustive Secondary Vegetation of Oak
Forest
Total Surface inside the NPA

Ejido Huaxtla

Ejido La
Primavera

136.28
561.54
0.26
-

29.74
43.82
323.99
0.35
-

698.08

397.91

Ejido Santa
Ana
Tepetitlán
0.65

Ejido El
Colli

J Ejido
Jocotán

28.31
426.62
49.14
31.34

6.37
231.80
2.14
78.49

237.98
193.14
12.81
-

552.29

327.86

443.93

Table 6-9 Land-Use and Vegetation: Bosque La Primavera Ejidos (1) Sources: Own
elaboration with data from INEGI, V Series: Land Use and Vegetation.
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Land use

Human Settlements
Seasonal Agriculture
Permanent Agriculture
Oak Forest
Oak-Pine Forest
Pine-Oak Forest
Inducted Grass
Secondary Arbustive Vegetation inside
BLP
Total Surface inside BLP

Venta del
Astillero

San
Agustín

Emiliano
Zapata

Tala

-

-

-

-

San Juan
de
Ocotán
0.29

4.07
-

35.49
-

7.27
-

308.68
19.48
-

7.96
-

451.68
201.27
195.41

619.56
30.4
-

255.70
-

1035.03
237.81

388.27
126.83
-

-

-

856.45

686.45

262.96

1601

523.34

Table 6-10 Land-Use and Vegetation: Bosque La Primavera Ejidos. Sources: Own
elaboration with data from INEGI, V Series: Land Use and Vegetation.

Figure 6-4 Ejido Land-Use and Vegetation within Bosque la Primavera. Sources:
Polígono de ANP: OPD bosque la Primavera, Ortofoto: INEGI. Ejidos, RAN, 2012.

136

Policy Implications
When it comes to public policy regarding the conservation alternatives for Bosque
La Primavera in the last years, the results have been very poor, most of the time leading to
political impasses. The four main alternatives that have been proposed thus far are: public
expropriation; a budget formula from municipalities that are adjacent to BLP; a state law
that earmarks payment for ecosystem services from the state budget; and a donation system
from visitors and “friends of the BLP.”
Although none of these alternatives are mutually exclusive and are not the main
objective of this case study, the truth is that each faces a collective action problem that has
prevented them from being implemented in a sound way. Therefore, I propose a more
incremental, inductive and polycentric approach that contributes at least partially to the
solution of the public policy issue at stake, namely, BLP forest fragmentation, degradation
and deforestation due to formal and informal economic-related activities and urban sprawl,
within a natural protected area and international biosphere reserve context.
It is important to note that the regulation and command and control system that has
been implemented for BLP in the last 30 years has been crucial for its maintenance, and
remains the cornerstone for conservation purposes. However, it is also clear that the natural
protected area status is insufficient to prevent all the disturbances and pressures that come
as a consequence of economic growth and urban sprawl. Within this venue, and in
alignment with the international PES literature, I consider that a sound local and user-based
set of PES schemes within a polycentric view is one of the key pieces of the puzzle to
resolve BLP issues. Although the construction of a polycentric system might take several
years to be put in place, scaled-up and replicated, I propose the first step is a pilot case
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study in Bosque La Primavera in the area known as Ejido San Agustin. In the future,
lessons may be drawn from Ejido San Agustin and potentially replicated in the other 10
Ejidos that le at the Bosque La Primavera. At the crux of this proposal is the search for
additionality and effectiveness of scarce financial resources, and co-management with
government parties.
Eventually, this case study proposal for Ejido San Agustin in Bosque La Primavera
is intended as a first step of an incremental approach that sets up the basic framework for a
polycentric system to minimize slippage and leakages within the other Ejidos and
properties, both public and private around Bosque La Primavera. For the purpose of this
dissertation, I will focus only on the Ejido San Agustin as a pilot project for 2015.
In order to develop a technically feasible user-based proposal for 2015, a
community-based participatory approach was carried out during a six month process.
During this time, I participated in four Ejido Assemblies and conducted in depth interviews
with the authorities of Ejido San Agustin. All of this work was lined up with the 2014 call
of Fondos Concurrentes from CNF. The aim of this proposal is two-fold. The first is to
meet the requirements and win a spot in the Concurrent Funds program funding
availability, which is based on a highly competitive basis with proposals from Ejidos and
private land owners nationwide. Secondly, once the Ejido is recognized by CNF, the
objective is to develop the five-year environmental service contracts for Ejido San Agustin.
According to the 2014 Fondos Concurrentes Guidelines, the main funding
allocation criteria from CNF are: i) a watershed based and/or biological corridor approach
ii) a monitoring and verification evaluation system with environmental, socioeconomic and
territorial interrelated indicators, preferably with baseline data; iii) a positive chain and
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positive spillover effects on sites that are adjacent to the proposed site; iv) Payment for
Environmental Service differentiation (if it applies to different forest types) and v) mapping
of potential buyers of the environmental service at the local level.
Clearly, demand for environmental service protection is greater than the financial
resources available to construct a local PES scheme, at least in the first years of program
implementation. As mentioned before, however, the intention is to identify and include
potential direct users during the five years of the program. In this sense, a complex array of
public and private users must be pinpointed and mapped in order to develop a long term
financial strategy. In principle, the so called “natural” environmental service users are the
Guadalajara Metro Area population. However, according to microeconomic neoclassical
theory, this broad definition of environmental service users implies that the forest has the
characteristic of a public good. Therefore, no financial instruments have been put in place
to address this issue, despite being on the public agenda for the last several years. A local
green tax bill earmarked for environmental services was proposed in 2011 but did not quite
enter the public agenda. The main argument against this initiative by political parties in
Congress was that it was more a municipal or inter-municipal rather than a state level issue.
As a consequence of the targeting criteria analyzed in Chapter 5, I display a set of
indicators that are directly related to natural protected areas in order to eventually construct
a state-based complementary targeting criteria system for BLP. Based on these seven
indicators, a weighted index is constructed for PES providers, in this case Ejido San
Agustin. In addition, a social capital indicator system is proposed at the inter-Ejido level.
An important issue taken from the international literature review on this topic is a
recommendation in the sense of making ex ante willingness-to-participate and willingness
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to be paid evaluations and the coincidence or alignment between the environmental services
that are provided from different Ejidos within Bosque La Primavera. Willingness to
participate is an often omitted or overlooked variable which is crucial for the future success
of the scheme. It is normally taken for granted that Ejidos that comply with the basic
criteria from the Fondos Concurrentes program and thereby are eligible to receive a certain
payment amount during five years will automatically have a will to participate.
Theoretically, this is consistent with a neoclassic approach; however, this behavior does not
necessarily hold within a behavioral economics or market failure approach. In particular,
for natural resource management, there is the “crowding out” effect. Equally important is
the payment amount that communities are willing to receive or be paid (USAID, 2014).
Empirical evidence from the 39 user-based local PES mechanisms show that the
great diversity of environmental services types around the country deserve additional
project selection criteria, adapted to local and regional conditions. The state of Mexico and
Veracruz have done this in recent years according to their policy goals. In this sense, given
the particular characteristics of Bosque La Primavera, it is relevant to construct a specific
framework that integrates the context-based variables of BLP which are not included in the
standardized federalized call for PES projects. This complementary call should be
competitive since public resources are scarce and should be efficiently allocated in order to
achieve additionality. For instance, in the federalized call, there are not points for fire risk
locations, which is one of the main issues in Bosque La Primavera.
Based on a meta-analysis of the literature of the last 30 years in BLP, along with
interviews with managers of the forest and policy makers at the state level who have had
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ample experience in BLP, I will propose a set of variables and indicators that set forward
the specific issues that could be addressed at the Bosque La Primavera local level29.

29

In 2012, University of Guadalajara published a repository of abstracts regarding research that has been carried out at Bosque La
Primavera from the Life Sciences perspectives. This bulk of academic work allows to identify significant variables that could be
measured and linked to the environmental services provided by Bosque La Primavera.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USER-BASED PES
SCHEMES IN MEXICO THROUGH THE FONDOS CONCURRENTES
PROGRAM.

Both at the design and implementation phases of PES schemes, there is always a
debate about whether or not those schemes should be outcome-based or action-based, and
how we can measure the additionality outcomes of those schemes. As stated before, one of
the main issues regarding PES schemes is with respect to the aftermath of PES contract
termination. Will Ejidos develop capabilities to sustainably manage their forests even
without payment? Will they just develop rent seeking behaviors and maximize public
subsidies, including environmentally harmful ones such as agriculture and livestock
subsidies, giving credence to the public choice interpretation, or, hopefully, will they work
on potential market identification and creation so that they can still be compensated
indefinitely by direct environmental service users? After all, one of the main collective
action issues regarding BLP management alternatives has been failure to recognize between
direct and indirect environmental service users. This proposal seeks to identify direct
environmental service users and establish the market channels to properly compensate the
environmental service providers before the PES scheme is finished. In other words,
participating in the Fondos Concurrentes initiative is just a transitional phase between
government Pigouvian subsidies and market creation with well-defined mechanisms and
property rights based on the Coase theorem.
During the implementation of the PES scheme, a decision tree bifurcation arises as
shown in figure 4.3. The main idea is to change behavioral patterns –as suggested by
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behavioral economics or changes in preferences during the five year duration of the
contract. Since pro-environmental preference change might take longer than five years, the
best way to ensure additionality is by identifying direct environmental service users and
finding the best payment vehicle and accountability mechanisms. Market creation should be
viewed as a complement rather than a substitute for best management and conservation
practices during the contract length in the hope that they serve as behavioral changing
incentives in the shortest possible time period. Specific proposals regarding best
management environmental practices are also included later in this chapter. Traditionally,
the key evaluation question remains as an empirical question. How likely is the sustainable
management behavior after contract termination and in the absence of a new and direct
public intervention?

Backslash regression
to former activities
-No additionalityEnrolled at the
program: 5 year
contract
Preconditions

Willingness to
Participate

"Successful exbeneficiarie"

No markets were
created but it
continues to apply
sustainable practices.

Second try to
participate in the
program

Local Markets are
created and high
levels of sustainable
practices are achieved

Rejected
Go back to traditional
BAU activities

Figure 7-1 Decision-tree from program beneficiaries for PES on Mexico
Source: Author Elaboration
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Community-Based Monitoring and Evaluation System (M&E)
As highlighted in the USAID document (2013), a key indicator to evaluate the
maturity of a user-based PES scheme, and hence its eventual capability to create markets
and develop pro-conservation behavior, is precisely through sound community-based
monitoring systems. These community-based monitoring systems are often accompanied
by state-of-the-art technological platforms, which are now available through different GIS
platforms. However, as wisely noted by Ostrom (2013), a gap has emerged between the
technological advancement for monitoring and verification systems and the local
knowledge of communities. Frequently, successful monitoring experiences come with
cooperation of academic institutions who provide methodologies and know-how. However,
local knowledge and attitudes, behaviors and norms are just as or more important than
technology itself. Only a very small percentage of local PES schemes within the Mexican
experience have been able to develop sound monitoring and evaluation systems. There are
multiple causes that explain the poor development of successful community-based
monitoring experiences, namely, high transaction and learning costs related with follow up
and monitoring, as well as low involvement of the whole community in a participatory
process when indicators are designed.
Overall, poor levels of communitarian verification and monitoring is also explained
by economic incentives. On the one hand, payments to certified technicians cannot exceed
eight percent of the PES. In most cases this level of compensation happens to be very low.
For instance, for Ejido San Agustin, a project of 650 hectares, this restriction would limit
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the wage to roughly $1400 USD annually. Clearly, in these cases the technical assistants
will try to maximize its income by expanding the project frontier with a larger number of
projects. The trade-off in this behavior is a checklist level of compliance without getting
deep in the issues of specific projects. For the monitoring component, the incentives are
similar.
Only a few research institutions–mostly located at or near Mexico City -develop
sound monitoring and evaluation mechanisms -. Similar to the technical assistance, the
monitoring and verification component cannot exceed 8 percent of the PES, giving little
incentive to institutions for participation. Moreover, according to some evaluations (CNF,
2014), the interplay between the technical assistance and the monitoring and verification
systems in the Mexican PES experience have proven to be messy and ineffective since the
technical assistance is often implemented by a forest practitioner, and the monitoring and
verification process is carried out by an academic institution which has a different
approach, belief system, methodologies and even language with regards to the technical
assistant. This gap reduces the likelihood and the incentives for finding common ground
and to develop a comprehensive strategy.
Given this structural problem, I proposed that the Direction of Bosque La
Primavera, a decentralized public entity, along with the state government of Jalisco
Environmental Secretariat directly take care of the technical assistance and monitoring
systems with their own human and technological resources. Prior to this phase, for the
Ejido San Agustin case, a focus group was conducted with the local community in order to
diagnose the main issues that must be addressed during the participation of the Ejido in the
program. Actually, during the first year of the program, participants are required to develop
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their own best management practices handbook. However, for short term purposes and as a
diagnosis, I conducted a focus group with community members in order to identify the
main issues regarding the state of the forest.
For the first time at the national level, a state government-based instance called The
Direction of Bosque La Primavera will seek to appropriate the technical assistance and the
verification and monitoring system, which is one of the main weaknesses of the young local
user-based concurrent funding experience.
Additional Policy-Oriented Recommendations
In order to be on the right path towards additionality for Ejido San Agustin, as well
to the other 10 Ejidos located in Bosque La Primavera, the following actions have been
identified by interviews and focus groups of local stakeholders as crucial to put in place in
the next years:
•

Communitarian appropriation of local best management practices as well as its
craftsmanship.

•

Holistic and polycentric systems that consider potential leakages and spillovers
generated by public intervention through the PES program.

•

Monitoring and verification systems that combine local knowledge and GIS
technology. (The latter has already been developed by the federal and state
government of Jalisco and is considered to be high level according to
international standards. The real challenge is to involve local communities in
their own monitoring process through social participation techniques.)
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•

Project selection processes of Ejido hectares based on relevant socio
environmental criteria. According to the operational rules of the Concurrent
Fund Program, subnational governments must contribute partially with funding
of the local scheme. Additionally, third parties that may further fund the
scheme, such as NGO`s, are also encouraged to participate. However, the
available earmarked funding for this initiative in the next five years is lower
than the potential demand of forested hectares among Bosque La Primavera, as
it usually happens in public programs.

•

Evaluation of preexisting social capital conditions. The prime way to counteract
collective action issues that are inevitable by the Ejido governance structure is
by having high social capital within the Ejido and sometimes even outside the
Ejido and at the community level. In other words, poor or non-existent levels of
social capital would jeopardize any local PES scheme. Therefore, it is very
important to make a preliminary evaluation of the social capital conditions
around the Ejido. If this step is omitted, there is a high risk of either a crowding
out effect or a failure to carry out best management practices and creating and
developing markets.

•

Environmental education having as a cornerstone a focus on the events that have
put the Bosque La Primavera situation in the public’s awareness. Some of the
most successful user-based local environmental service schemes in Mexico had
their initial momentum as a consequence of a focusing effect. For example, a
long and intense drought in the southern state of Veracruz in the late nineties led
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to social cohesion and environmental awareness that made it easier to
implement a local environmental service scheme.
•

Pre-identify potential environmental service users, market integration levels and
urban development levels and their trends for the next years in order to estimate
dimension and account for potential market creation mechanisms.
Public Management Issues

Overall, an opportunity area identified in the last months during intervention at
Ejido San Agustin was the need for sound information filing regarding basic administrative
documents of the Ejido, as well as mapping of different parcels and common areas.
Interviews with state policy-makers have shown that this is a general trend that is present in
most Ejidos in Bosque La Primavera. Actually, some Ejidos do not have their own
documents, so they must be requested every time they want to participate in a program.
This strategy is inefficient, increases transaction costs and lessens chances to successfully
be considered as viable participants. The proposal in this venue is at the organizational
level by creating or adapting an administrative area either at the Bosque La Primavera
Directorate, or at the Environmental Secretariat from the state of Jalisco.
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This issue is important not only for administrative purposes, but also as an accountability
and transparency tool inside the Ejido governance and future participatory processes since
it allows Ejido members to better plan and understand which communal areas will be
intervened, and how they will be measured and modified during the next five years.

A Comprehensive Monitoring and Verification Strategy
Currently, there is an evaluation boom in Mexico and Latin America regarding
monitoring, report and verification (MRV) methodologies related to CO2 mitigation and
adaptation emissions in the context of climate change policy. Under this juncture, carbon
sequestration PES projects as well as Reduction of Emissions due to Deforestation and
Degradation policies have been subject to MRV monitoring. Although the implementation
of these procedures is still in its infancy and are basically targeted to carbon sequestration
projects, not hydrological or recreational, the MRV experience could be used to set up a
less technical and more bottom-up craftsmanship-based approach which could be
developed to measure outcomes for PES locally-based projects such as the ones that are
promoted in Bosque La Primavera. In order to be useful and effective, this process must be
participatory and developed during the first year of PES implementation.
Based on the author’s field work and in-depth interviews with Ejido authorities, some
general trends have been found regarding the main problems facing the forested common
area that has been proposed for a PES scheme. These problems include illegal timber,
plagues, inadequate reforestation, invasive species, insufficient anti-firing ditches and fires,
and litter from recreational visitors during weekends. Successful experiences of local PES
schemes in terms of verification and monitoring are scant not only because of technological
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and human capital difficulties, but also due to the inability of Ejido members ejidatarios,
local governments, and environmental service users to build up and construct
environmental partnerships. In order to consolidate an agreed upon monitoring and
verification indicator system that is technologically sound and appropriated by the
community. Eventually, this monitoring system could lead to impact evaluations,
depending on how sound the baseline indicators are approached during the first years of
participating in the program. In any case, the current juncture allows us to at least think
about those indicators in order to do impact evaluation on the projects.
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